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Fragmented Lives: Disability Discrimination
and the Role of "Environment-Framing"
Ani B. Satz*
Abstract
This Article presents a novel theory that courts undermine the purpose
of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) by implicitly embracing
environment-frames that disfavor disability protections. Courts employ
environment-frames at two stages of judicial analysis under the Act: the
disability eligibility and remedy stages. In determining whether a plaintiff
is in the statutorily protected class, courts typically use a broad
environment-frame to assess limitation of a "major life activity." The
larger the environment-frame, the more likely a court will view an
individual as able to perform a major life activity in some portion of her
environment and deny her protected class status. By contrast, in the
remedy context courts use narrow environment-frames. The smaller the
environment-frame (e.g., a cubicle workspace rather than an office
building), the greater the likelihood a court will perceive an individual as
functional and deny her reasonable accommodation or other modification.
Environment-frames thus fragment the human experience of disability, by
creating a disconnection between the lived and the legally recognized
aspects of disability. The ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (AAA), fails to
address these problems. The AAA broadens the definition of disability, but
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it does not examine or change the environments in which courts assess an
individual’s ability to function.
I propose a two-part solution to address the problems of environmentframing. First, courts must adopt broad environment-frames for both
eligibility and remedy purposes. To determine eligibility, courts should
assess individuals with functional impairments in a broad environment that
includes workplace, home, and other environments in the civic and social
realms.
Similarly, individuals requesting accommodation or other
modification should have their claims assessed within a broad environment
that captures the nature of what they are trying to access, e.g., a place of
employment rather than an office space. Second, courts must interpret an
individual’s ability to function in a more holistic or complete manner by
gaining a better understanding of the effects of impairment throughout a
broad environment. To ensure that the ability to function in some portion
of a broad environment does not undermine disability status, I suggest a
method of assessment similar to the one employed in Social Security
disability benefits cases. Despite the Social Security Act’s relatively
restrictive definition of disability, courts employ a more favorable
assessment of a broad environment that does not limit eligibility for benefits
in most cases. A holistic view of functioning within a broad environment
would also afford more meaningful reasonable accommodation or other
modification.
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I. Introduction
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA)1 prohibits
disability discrimination as a matter of civil right for those who qualify as
disabled.2 For almost two decades after the passage of the ADA,
membership in the disability protected class was restricted by U.S. Supreme
Court jurisprudence.3 The Court narrowly interpreted two components of
1. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2006),
amended by ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553
[hereinafter ADA] (providing protection against discrimination for individuals with
disabilities).
2. See id. § 12101 (mandating the "elimination of discrimination against individuals
with disabilities").
3. See Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 201 (2002) (finding
that a factory worker who could not perform "‘repetitive work with hands and arms extended
at or above shoulder levels for extended periods of time’" but who was able to complete a
number of household tasks may not be "substantially limited" in the major life activity of
performing manual tasks (quoting Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 224 F.3d 840,
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the disability threshold test, namely, whether a physical or mental
impairment "substantially limits"4 a "major life activity."5 In 2008,
Congress passed the ADA Amendments Act (AAA),6 which seeks to
broaden the class of individuals protected under the ADA.7 The Act lowers
the burden for proving a "substantial limitation,"8 broadens the concept of
"major life activities,"9 and assesses an individual’s impairment before the
benefits of drugs, assistive devices, or other mitigation.10
While the AAA increases protection for individuals with disabilities
by broadening eligibility for the protected class, it does not address the
relevant environment in which to assess impairments.11
Judicial
construction of an unfavorable environment may undermine protections.12
For example, if an assembly line employee with a functional limitation
affecting her work is assessed for her ability to perform manual tasks at
both home and work, she may be able to function in some portion of her
843 (6th Cir. 2000))); see also Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 492–93 (1999)
(finding that twin sister pilots with severe myopia were not "substantially limited" in any
major life activity or "regarded as" so limited in the major life activity of working);
Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 566 (1999) (finding that a truck driver with
monocular vision was not "substantially limited" in the major life activity of seeing);
Murphy v. UPS, 527 U.S. 516, 521 (1999) (finding that a mechanic with severe hypertension
was not "substantially limited" in any major life activity or "regarded as" so limited in the
major life activity of working).
4. See Toyota Motor Mfg., 534 U.S. at 198 ("[T]o be substantially limited in
performing manual tasks, an individual must have an impairment that prevents or severely
restricts the individual from doing activities that are of central importance to most people’s
daily lives.").
5. See id. at 197 ("‘Major life activities’ . . . refers to those activities that are of
central importance to daily life.").
6. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553, 3553
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2006)) [hereinafter AAA] (restoring the "intent and
protections" of the ADA).
7. See id. § 2(b)(1), 122 Stat. at 3554 (describing one of the purposes of the AAA as
"reinstating a broad scope of protection" under the ADA).
8. See id. § 2(b)(4)–(6), 122 Stat. at 3554 (noting Supreme Court decisions restricting
eligibility for disability protections under the ADA).
9. See id. § 4(a), 122 Stat. at 3555–56 (providing examples of "major life activities").
10. See id. (assessing impairment without considering the effects of mitigating
measures). The AAA does not address remedies for disability discrimination or the nature
of remedies—areas of disability rights analysis that will likely receive greater attention as a
larger number of individuals qualify as disabled under the ADA.
11. See id. (amending the definition of "disabled" but not addressing the issue of the
environment in which disability is to be assessed).
12. See, e.g., Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 201 (2002)
(considering a home and work environment for a workplace discrimination claim).
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home environment and not be considered disabled.13 If she is assessed only
in her workplace environment, however, she may be viewed as disabled.
Broad understanding of "substantially limits" and "major life activities"
cannot overcome this issue of environment selection. Thus, no matter how
expansive the definition of "disability" is under the AAA,14 individuals may
be assessed in an environment that disfavors or denies them protected class
membership.
Courts also use unfavorable environments in the remedy context,
which the AAA does not address. At this stage of disability analysis, courts
assess individuals in narrow environments, often denying accommodation
or other modification.15 In this situation, an individual who is viewed as
able to function in a portion of her environment, such as an office cubicle,
may not receive accommodation to access other areas of the workplace, like
break or copy rooms.
Thus, the environments in which the effects of impairments are
assessed for purposes of disability protections are significant because they
determine judicial outcomes. My analysis of federal case law reveals that
the environments used by most courts limit disability protections at two
discrete stages: the disability threshold (eligibility) and remedy stages.
Under the disability threshold test, courts typically assume a broad
environment-frame, and an individual who is able to function in some
portion of her environment is not considered disabled.16 When determining
whether a plaintiff with a disability is entitled to a remedy, however, courts
adopt a narrow environment-frame that limits or denies accommodation or
other modification.17 Thus, at both ends of judicial analysis—eligibility for
the protected class and remedy—tacit judicial framing undercuts disability
civil rights protections. This fragments the human experience of living with
disability, as one’s actual experience differs from the legally recognized
one.18
Courts exclude from the protected class individuals with
13. These are the basic facts of Toyota. Id. While the AAA rejects several aspects of
Toyota, it does not directly address the environment-frame to be assessed. Infra note 55 and
accompanying text. The AAA clarifies that an individual needs to have a substantial
limitation in only one major life activity, but does not speak to the environment in which to
assess it. AAA, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 4(a), 122 Stat. 3553, 3555–56 (2008) (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 12102 (2006)).
14. See AAA § 4(a), 122 Stat. at 3555–56 (noting that the definition of disability
should be "construed in favor of broad coverage").
15. Infra Part III.
16. Infra Part II.
17. Infra Part III.
18. I develop my theory of fragmentation and discuss its implications for individuals
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impairments who identify as disabled and deny accommodation or other
modification to individuals with impairments who request it to function. It
is worth emphasizing that courts could choose a large or small environment
for disability analysis, but instead they frame environments broadly at one
stage and narrowly at the other, resulting in the denial of most claims.
The U.S. Supreme Court and lower federal courts have not addressed
directly the relevant environments for assessing disability eligibility or
remedy. Since the passage of the ADA, courts have assessed disability and
remedy within environments determined on an ad hoc basis.19 Courts have
not discussed why environments are framed in certain ways, and have
framed environments inconsistently.20
This Article is the first to develop a theory of "environment-framing"
in disability law and to discuss the importance of environment-frames for
disability protections.21 I use "environment-frames" to mean the physical
spaces in which individuals are assessed for legal protection.22
with impairments in Ani B. Satz, Overcoming Fragmentation in Disability and Health Law,
60 EMORY L.J. (forthcoming 2011) [hereinafter Overcoming Fragmentation].
"Environment-framing" is discussed as "micro-level fragmentation" in that article, as it
occurs at the level of judicial interpretation of statutes—rather than as a result of plain
language of laws and regulations—which I argue results in "macro-level fragmentation." Id.
19. See infra Parts II and III (showing how courts have utilized environment-frames in
disability cases).
20. See infra Parts II and III (showing the varying ways in which courts have utilized
environment-frames).
21. See infra Parts II and III (discussing environment-framing in relation to
establishing disability and determining remedy).
22. The term "framing" is used by Mark Kelman to discuss temporal boundaries for
viewing criminal conduct and by Daryl Levinson to define transactions in constitutional law.
See generally Mark Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33
STAN. L. REV. 591 (1981); Daryl J. Levinson, Framing Transactions in Constitutional Law,
111 YALE L.J. 1311 (2002). Levinson argues that frames in constitutional law should not
"creat[e] or negat[e] individualized harm, but instead . . . direct judicial attention to the types
and patterns of government behavior that are significant for purposes of implementing
particular constitutional norms." Id. at 1317. My use of "frame" is only loosely related to
either Kelman’s or Levinson’s construction. While I use "frame" to mean a boundary, my
concept differs in nature and scope. I am concerned only with physical spaces and
individual (though holistic) assessment.
"Frames" are also used in the social sciences—including computer science,
environmental science, and behavioral economics—to discuss boundaries. I do not intend to
invoke those meanings in this Article, though interesting insights might be gained from
interdisciplinary work on frames. As Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler argue in Nudge, for
example, studies in behavioral economics indicate our choices are affected by subtle
persuasion or "choice architecture" within our environment. See generally RICHARD H.
THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND
HAPPINESS (2008). The effect of this, if any, on lawyering strategy or legal outcomes might
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Constructing a frame broadly may allow for a holistic or more complete
consideration of an individual’s functional capacities, though functioning in
any part of a broad environment could be viewed as reason to disallow a
disability claim. Conversely, a narrow environment-frame provides a
snapshot view of an individual’s ability to function and may not capture the
degree of a functional impairment or the extent to which accommodation or
other modification is needed.
After developing a theory of environment-framing,23 this Article offers
a two-part solution to address the problems of such framing.24 Both of my
proposals entail a change in judicial construction of the ADA, rather than
further amendment to the statute.25 First, I suggest that courts should use
broad environment-frames for both eligibility and remedy purposes. Courts
should assess an individual with functional impairments in a broad
environment that includes workplace, home, and other relevant
environments in the civic and social realms. At the eligibility stage, this
will entail the continued use of a broad frame, though, as I explain below, a
change in judicial interpretation of that frame. At the remedy stage, this
will require courts to shift from a narrow to a broad environment-frame.
Second, courts should interpret an individual’s ability to function in a
more holistic or complete manner by gaining a better understanding of the
effects of impairment throughout a broad environment. While most courts
currently employ a broad environment-frame for disability eligibility
purposes under the ADA, they assess that environment in a manner that
results in unwarranted conclusions about an individual’s functional
impairments. Courts currently view an individual’s ability to function in a
portion of her life as almost dispositive evidence against disability.26 Such
evidence of functioning is relevant to, but must not be determinative of,
eligibility for the protected class.27 While the AAA broadens the definition
of disability and specifies that an individual must have a substantial
limitation of only one major life activity, it does not directly address the
relevant environment in which to assess the effects of impairment or the
method for doing so.28 To ensure that the ability to function in some
be an area for future work.
23. Infra Parts II and III.
24. Infra Part V.
25. Infra Part V.
26. Infra Part II.
27. Infra Part V.
28. Infra Part IV.
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portion of a broad environment does not undermine disability status, I
suggest a method of assessment similar to the one employed in Social
Security disability benefits cases.29 Despite the Social Security Act’s
relatively restrictive definition of disability, courts employ a more favorable
assessment of a broad environment that does not limit eligibility for
benefits in most cases.30 Similarly, at the remedy stage, claims for
accommodation or other modification should be considered within an
environment broad enough to afford meaningful access.
This Article is divided into five parts following the Introduction. Part
II explores the role of environment-framing in federal disability protected
class litigation. I argue that the broader the environment-frame used, the
less likely an individual will be deemed eligible for disability protections.
This Part focuses on litigation addressing "substantial limitation of a major
life activity."31 I explore the cases that pertain to the major life activity of
"working" in detail, since they serve as an excellent example of the
spectrum of environment-frames adopted by federal courts determining
eligibility. Part III discusses environment-framing and remedy. The
narrower the environment-frame chosen in this context, the less likely an
individual will receive an accommodation or other modification. In this
Part, I focus on litigation about prison and jail modification because it
provides perhaps the best example of the many ways in which
environments may be framed for remedy purposes, even within a finite,
clearly defined space. Part IV discusses the ADA Amendments Act of
2008,32 its potential weaknesses for addressing environment-framing, and
the possibility that constructing environment-frames in a certain manner
could undermine the Act’s purpose to expand protected class membership.
Part V explores the holistic, aggregative method of assessing disability in
Social Security benefits cases as a means to interpret environment-frames.
The Social Security Administration and reviewing courts assess
individuals’ functioning across the environments in which they move,
rather than in discrete situations.33 Unlike in the ADA context, however,
29. Infra Part V.A.
30. Infra Part V.A; see also infra note 303 (citing Grizzle v. Macon Cnty., in which the
individual qualified for Social Security benefits but not for disability benefits under the
ADA).
31. See ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A) (2006) (defining a disability as "a physical or
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of such
individual").
32. AAA, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 4(a), 122 Stat. 3553, 3555–56 (2008) (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 12102 (2006)).
33. Infra Part V.A.2.
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functioning in a portion of a broad environment does not preclude disability
status. I argue in this Part that courts should adopt a version of this method
of environment-frame assessment for eligibility and remedy purposes under
the ADA. Part VI concludes the Article by considering why courts
currently frame environments as they do under the ADA, with trends
toward broad frames for disability eligibility assessment and small frames
for remedy analysis. I suggest that judicial use of these environmentframes may be the result of an unfunded civil rights mandate that provides
for reasonable accommodation or other modification.34
II. Environment-Framing and Protected Class
Courts frame environments on an ad hoc basis when assessing
individuals under established statutory tests for eligibility for disability
protections.35 The relevant tests include whether an individual has a
"mental or physical impairment"36 and also whether that impairment
"substantially limits" a "major life activity."37 Judicial trends indicate that
the broader the environment-frame, the more likely an individual will be
perceived as functional within it and denied membership in the disability
class.38 Typically this phenomenon is not an issue with respect to the
"physical or mental impairment" component of the disability threshold test
because most courts turn to perhaps the smallest environment-frame—one’s
own body—and recognize an impairment.39 Judicial frames for "major life
34. See infra note 233 (discussing "unfunded mandate").
35. Infra Part II.
36. ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A).
37. Id. The ADA also covers individuals with "a record of such an impairment" or
who are "regarded as having such an impairment." Id. § 12102(1)(B)–(C). Individuals with
a record of a disability must prove that the record is for a disability that meets the
requirements for actual disability. Id. Thus, the arguments about environment-framing in
this Part apply to the "record" prong as well. After the AAA, "regarded as" plaintiffs are no
longer required to meet the standard for actual disability, so environment-frames are less
likely to play a role in "regarded as" cases. AAA § 4(a), 122 Stat. at 3555–56. Plaintiffs are
not entitled to accommodation for "regarded as" discrimination under the AAA, however.

Id.
38. Infra Part II.
39. For example, a "physical or mental impairment" has been an issue in only one of
the over twenty U.S. Supreme Court cases decided under the ADA. See Bragdon v. Abbott,
524 U.S. 624, 637 (1998) (holding that HIV, which affects an individual’s CD4+ [white cell]
counts, constitutes a "physical impairment"). In Bragdon, the Court deemed the relevant
environment-frame to be the cells within one’s own body, and held that the plaintiff was
disabled. Id.
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activities," however, tend to be broad.40 In many "major life activity" cases,
large environment-frames preclude membership in the protected class.41
This Part is divided into two subparts. Subpart A provides a brief
overview of trends in litigation about "major life activities."42 Subpart B
provides a detailed discussion of the use of environment-frames for the
major life activity of "working."43 I emphasize "working" because courts
employ a spectrum of environments to assess limitation of this major life
activity. Further, it is the only major life activity that the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) regulations directly
acknowledge requires courts to determine environment-frames or
"geographical areas."44 Statutory and regulatory guidance regarding how to
frame environments for "working" is lacking, however, and even in this
context courts often do so in an ad hoc manner.45
A. "Major Life Activity"
The ADA covers a broad range of "major life activities," including
"caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating,
sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning,
reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, [] working," and "major
bodily functions."46 Courts consider a "substantial limitation" of a major
life activity by assessing an individual’s ability to function within a
particular physical space.47 This space constitutes the "environment-frame"
40. Infra Part II.
41. Infra Part II.
42. See ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A) (2006) (requiring "substantial limitation" in
"one or more major life activities" to establish disability).
43. AAA, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 4(a), 122 Stat. 3553, 3555–56 (2008) (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 12102 (2006)) (listing "working" as a major life activity).
44. See Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the ADA, 29
C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii)(A) (2010) (listing "geographical area" as a relevant consideration
for the major life activity of "working"); see also ADA § 12102(1)(A) (defining disability as
an impairment that "substantially limits" a major life activity).
45. Infra Part II.B.
46. ADA § 12102(2)(A). "Major bodily functions" are defined as "including, but not
limited to, functions of the immune system, normal cell growth, digestive, bowel, bladder,
neurological, brain, respiratory, circulatory, endocrine, and reproductive functions." Id.
§ 12102(2)(B).
47. See id. § 12111(9) (discussing reasonable accommodation); §§ 12142, 12143(a),
12144, 12146, 12147, 12182(b)(2)(B)–(C), 12184(a)–(b) (discussing transportation);
§§ 12182(a)–(b), 12183 (discussing public accommodation).
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in which courts measure an individual’s functional abilities. Except for
some limited guidance with respect to the major life activity of "working,"
the ADA and supporting regulations do not address the environment-frames
courts should use to assess an individual.48 Courts also do not explicitly
discuss environment-frames outside the major life activity of "working,"
though they expand or contract the frames implicitly used with respect to
other major life activities to recognize or deny protected class status.49
Courts employ a spectrum of environment-frames. Cases in which
narrow environment-frames are used typically involve frames of a
workplace or a specific place of public service or accommodation.50 Courts
adopting broad frames most often consider an environment of both an
individual’s home and workplace, or society in general.51 Of course one’s
home and workplace environments are also subject to interpretation, and
these environments may be narrowly or broadly construed as well, which
adds another layer of complexity to understanding environment-frames.52
An analysis of federal cases reveals two trends. First, typically the
larger the environment-frame used by a court, the more likely an individual
will be able to perform a major life activity in some portion of her
environment and will be denied protected class status.53 This may seem
48. See 29 C.F.R § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii)(B)–(C) (stating the need to assess the
"geographical area").
49. See infra Part IV (discussing how, despite the AAA, courts may continue to
construct environment-frames to deny eligibility for disability protections).
50. See, e.g., Adams v. Rice, 531 F.3d 936, 949 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (using an
environment-frame of the workplace); Gribben v. UPS, 528 F.3d 1166, 1171 (9th Cir. 2008)
(same); Chalfant v. Titan Distribution, Inc., 475 F.3d 982, 989 (8th Cir. 2007) (same).
51. See, e.g., Simpson v. Ala. Dep’t of Human Res., 311 F. App’x 264, 268 (11th Cir.
2009) (using an environment-frame of society); Fikes v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 322 F. App’x 882,
884 (11th Cir. 2009) (using an environment-frame of home and work); Lord v. Arizona, 286
F. App’x 364, 365–66 (9th Cir. 2008) (same); Gruener v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 510 F.3d 661,
664–65 (6th Cir. 2008) (same); Singh v. George Wash. Univ. Sch. of Med. & Health Sci.,
508 F.3d 1097, 1103–04 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (using an environment-frame of society); Rolland
v. Potter, 492 F.3d 45, 49 (1st Cir. 2007) (using an environment-frame of home and work);
Ashton v. AT&T Co., 225 F. App’x 61, 67 (3d Cir. 2007) (same); Hill v. Steven Motors,
Inc., 97 F. App’x 267, 276 (10th Cir. 2004) (using an environment-frame of spaces in which
plaintiff learned and moved).
52. Infra Part II.B.
53. Compare Fikes v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 322 F. App’x 882, 884 (11th Cir. 2009) (using a
broad environment-frame and finding that plaintiff was not substantially limited in a major
life activity), Lord v. Arizona, 286 F. App’x 364, 365–66 (9th Cir. 2008) (same), Gruener v.
Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 510 F3d 661, 664–65 (6th Cir. 2008) (same), Singh v. George Wash.
Univ. Sch. of Med. & Health Sci., 508 F.3d 1097, 1103–04 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (same), Rolland
v. Potter, 492 F.3d 45, 49 (1st Cir. 2007) (same), Ashton v. AT&T Co., 225 F. App’x 61, 67
(3d Cir. 2007) (same), and Hill v. Steven Motors, Inc., 97 F. App’x 267, 276 (10th Cir.
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counter-intuitive, since one might think that the broader the frame, the more
likely one could find a substantial limitation of a major life activity
somewhere in the environment. However, the cases reveal courts reach the
opposite conclusion at the eligibility stage. The second trend is that few
courts employ narrow frames at the eligibility stage. This may indicate that
courts either view broad frames as better for assessing functional capacities
(a proposition rejected in Part III), or that environment-framing plays a role
in restricting protected class membership.
The most notable example of a court constructing an environmentframe broadly and finding that the plaintiff was not disabled is Toyota
Motor Manufacturing v. Williams.54 While the AAA overturns the test for
"substantially limits" developed in Toyota and specifies that an individual
needs to be substantially limited in only one major life activity, the Act
does not speak to the environment-frame used in the case.55 In Toyota, an
individual with severe carpal tunnel syndrome who alleged limitation of the
major life activity of "performing manual tasks" was assessed in both her
home and workplace environments.56 The U.S. Supreme Court overturned
the lower court’s partial grant of summary judgment for the plaintiff
because the Court found that the plaintiff’s ability to complete some vital
household manual tasks raised a genuine issue of material fact about her
disability status.57 Numerous other federal decisions deny protected class
status using the same environment-frame.58 While the AAA lowers the
2004) (same), with Adams v. Rice, 531 F.3d 936, 949 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (using a narrow
environment-frame and finding that plaintiff was substantially impaired in a major life
activity), Gribben v. UPS, 528 F.3d 1166, 1171 (9th Cir. 2008) (same), and Chalfant v. Titan
Distribution, Inc., 475 F.3d 982, 989 (8th Cir. 2007) (same).
The proposed EEOC regulations seem to recognize the difficulty, though they extend
beyond the statute: "In determining whether an individual has a disability, the focus is on
how a major life activity is substantially limited, not on what an individual can do in spite of
an impairment." Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the ADA,
74 Fed. Reg. 48431, 48440 (proposed Sept. 23, 2009) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1630).
The example provided involves a student with a learning disability who "has achieved a high
level of academic success, such as graduating from college." Id. at 48442. The example
continues, "[t]he determination of whether an individual has a disability does not depend on
what an individual is able to do in spite of an impairment." Id.
54. See Toyota Motor Mfg. Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 200–02 (2002)
(finding that a factory worker who could perform some household manual tasks may not be
"substantially limited" in the major life activity of performing manual tasks).
55. AAA, Pub. L. No. 110-325, §§ 2(b)(4)–(5), 4(a), 122 Stat. 3553, 3554, 3555–56
(2008) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, 12102 (2006)).
56. Toyota Motor Mfg. , 534 U.S. at 200–02.
57. Id. at 200–03.
58. See generally Fikes v. Wal-Mart, Inc., No. 97-2897, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 7669
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threshold for demonstrating a "substantial limitation," an individual may
still be assessed in a broad environment and denied disability status if she is
able to function in some portion of it. As Part IV discusses, litigation after
the AAA indicates that the method for assessing broad environment-frames
will not change.
Many disability eligibility cases involve the major life activity of
"working."
The next subpart provides a detailed examination of
environment-framing in this area.
B. "Working" and Geography
The major life activity of "working"59 is the one area where courts
have acknowledged the need to frame an environment for disability
analysis, though little agreement exists about how to do so. As of this
writing, only one case involving the major life activity of "working" has
been decided directly under the AAA, and the court did not discuss the
requirements for establishing limitation of the major life activity.60 Prior to
the AAA, EEOC regulations stated that to be "substantially limited" in
"working," an individual was required to demonstrate that her impairment
prevented her from participating in a "class of jobs or broad range of jobs in
various classes as compared to the average person having comparable
training, skills and abilities."61 A "class of jobs" was "the number and types
(11th Cir. Apr. 10, 2009) (using an environment-frame of home and work); Lord v. Arizona,
286 F. App’x 364 (9th Cir. 2008) (same); Lloyd v. Wash. & Jefferson Coll., 288 F. App’x
786 (3d Cir. 2008) (same); Gruener v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 510 F.3d 661 (6th Cir. 2008)
(same); Berry v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 490 F.3d 1211 (10th Cir. 2007) (same); Rolland v.
Potter, 492 F.3d 45 (1st Cir. 2007) (same); Ashton v. AT&T Co., 225 F. App’x 61 (3d Cir.
2007) (same); Carruthers v. BSA Adver., Inc., 357 F.3d 1213 (11th Cir. 2004) (same).
59. The AAA lists "working" as a major life activity. AAA § 4(a), 122 Stat. at 3555–
56. While the Supreme Court has not recognized "working" as a major life activity, it was
widely viewed as a major life activity by the lower federal courts. See Sutton v. United Air
Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 491–92 (1999) ("Because the parties accept that the term ‘major
life activities’ includes working, we do not determine the validity of the cited regulations.").
60. See Wurzel v. Whirlpool Corp., No. 3:09CV498, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36635, at
*20 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 14, 2010) (involving an individual who was "regarded as" disabled).
Since after the AAA it is no longer necessary for a "regarded as" plaintiff to show a
perception of a substantial limitation of a major life activity, the court in Wurzel did not
discuss the degree of plaintiff’s limitation in "working."
61. Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the ADA, 29
C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) (2010); see also Fournier v. Payco Foods Corp., 611 F. Supp. 2d
120, 131 (D.P.R. 2009) (requiring a "multi-level analysis, starting with the skills of plaintiff,
and moving to the nature of the jobs [he] was prevented from performing as well as those
[he] was not").
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of jobs utilizing similar training, knowledge, skills or abilities, within [the
employee’s] geographical area."62 A "broad range of jobs" was "the
number and types of other jobs not utilizing similar training, knowledge,
skills or abilities, within [the employee’s] geographical area."63 The
"geographical area" was viewed as that "to which the individual has
reasonable access."64 Lack of further statutory or regulatory guidance about
how to frame the relevant geographic environment resulted in courts
utilizing a range of environments, from a specific department of a company
to any job in the national economy.
Cases indicate that typically the broader the environment-frame, the
less likely an individual will be recognized as impaired in the major life
activity of "working."65 This is because one will be perceived as able to
work in some portion of the designated environment, and thus as not
disabled. Further, a broad environment-frame poses a high evidentiary
burden for plaintiffs who may not have documentation of limitations
beyond a particular workplace. Exceptions to broad frames limiting
eligibility under the major life activity of "working" only arise in cases of
egregious employer conduct.66
This Subpart discusses the various environments adopted by courts
with respect to "class of jobs" and "broad range of jobs." While some
courts address geography more directly than others, generally the broader
the characterization of employment, the broader the environment-frame, as
more areas within the geographic region will offer employment
opportunities. For "class of jobs," courts adopt environment-frames
encompassing an employment field or profession and jobs containing
certain characteristics; the latter category may overlap with more than one
employment field or profession. Environment-frames for "broad range of
jobs" include jobs of a firm at a particular location or of a firm in all
locations. Within each subcategory of "class of jobs" and "broad range of
jobs," environment-frames may also vary.

62. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii)(B).
63. Id. § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii)(C).
64. Id. § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii)(A).
65. See infra notes 82–103, 109–17, 135–51 and accompanying text (discussing
various cases where courts framed work environments broadly and denied individuals
disability status).
66. One might also expect exceptions where an employee would be disabled in almost
any context, or when the court merges disability and accommodation analysis (see infra note
167), but the cases do not demonstrate this.

FRAGMENTED LIVES

201

This Subpart will not address the narrowest possible environmentframe for "class of jobs" or "broad range of jobs," i.e., a particular job at a
specific workplace.67 In Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.,68 the U.S.
Supreme Court explicitly rejected such a narrow construction, invoking the
EEOC regulations prohibiting "working" from being construed as a "single,
particular job."69 I examine the potential impact of the AAA on the major
life activity of "working" in Part IV.A.2.
1. "Class of Jobs"
Environment-frames for "class of jobs" may be built around
employment fields or professions, or jobs with certain characteristics that
may span more than one employment field or profession. So long as an
individual demonstrates a substantial limitation in performing more than a
particular job at a specific company, the environments assessed may vary in
size.70 This Section demonstrates that the broader the environment
considered for "class of jobs," the more difficult it is for plaintiffs to prove
limitation in the major life activity of "working." Plaintiffs experience
difficulty demonstrating disability, once the environment considered
extends beyond the immediate workplace.
Most of the cases in this Section discuss individuals who are "regarded
as" (perceived as) disabled in a "class of jobs."71 Prior to the AAA, the
67. This environment-frame creates the lowest evidentiary burden for a plaintiff trying
to prove a limitation of the major life activity of "working," given the small environment and
the employee’s demonstrated difficulty functioning within the workplace.
68. See generally Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
69. Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the ADA, 29
C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) (2010); see Sutton, 527 U.S. at 491–93 (stating it is insufficient to be
precluded from "one type of job, a specialized job, or a particular job of choice"); see also
Dillon v. Mountain Coal Co., 569 F.3d 1215, 1220 (10th Cir. 2009) (holding that an
employee is not "regarded as" disabled because his employer may have perceived him as
unable to work a job at a particular mine); E.E.O.C. v. Schneider Nat’l, Inc., 481 F.3d 507,
512 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding that an employee was not "regarded as" disabled by an
employer that "perceived him as unfit for a particularly dangerous truck-driving position");
Harris v. Proviso Area for Exceptional Children, 581 F. Supp. 2d 942, 955 (N.D. Ill. 2008)
(holding that a teacher was not limited in her ability to work because she failed to offer
evidence that she was limited in other education positions in Chicago).
70. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 491–93; Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment
Provisions of the ADA, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii)(B)–(C) (2010).
71. See ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2006) ("The term ‘disability’ [includes], with
respect to an individual—being regarded as having . . . an impairment that substantially
limits one or more major life activities.").
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evidentiary burden for individuals establishing an actual disability and a
perceived one was the same: An individual asserting a "regarded as" claim
was required to demonstrate that her perceived impairment, if actual, would
"substantially limit" her in a major life activity.72 The AAA eliminates the
need for plaintiffs to show a substantial limitation of a major life activity
for a perceived impairment; it also restricts reasonable accommodation to
actual disability claims.73 As a result of eliminating accommodation for
"regarded as" plaintiffs, in the future most major life activity of "working"
claims will likely be brought as actual rather than "regarded as" disability
actions. Arguably courts will continue to turn to the pre-AAA "regarded
as" cases discussed below for guidance, however, because they comprise
the bulk of the "class of jobs" cases and utilize the same standard for
"substantial limitation" as actual disability cases.
a. Employment Field or Profession
Courts consider a number of employment fields74 and professions to be
"classes of jobs." Both narrow and broad environment-frames are used to
describe these jobs. Generally, the narrower the frame, the easier it is for a
plaintiff to establish a limitation in the major life activity of "working."
Narrow environment-frames for employment fields or professions
result in plaintiffs being considered part of the protected class. In Morris v.
Mayor of Baltimore,75 the court constructed the environment-frame for the
"class of jobs" for a firefighter as jobs within a particular fire department.76
The court held that the plaintiff was "regarded as" being precluded from
various jobs within the department because of knee, wrist, and ankle
72. Id. § 12102(2)(C).
73. AAA, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 4(a), 122 Stat. 3553, 3555–56 (2008) (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 12102 (2006)). A plaintiff may still obtain an order to reinstate employment,
provide back pay, or cease discriminatory conduct.
74. The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized "mechanics" as a "class of jobs." See
Murphy v. UPS, 527 U.S. 516, 524–25 (1999) (holding that plaintiff failed to demonstrate he
was unable to perform a "class of jobs" because he could perform different mechanic jobs);
see also EEOC v. Daimler Chrysler Corp., 111 F. App’x 394, 402–03 (6th Cir. 2004)
(assuming without deciding "mechanics" constituted a "class of jobs"); Broussard v. Univ. of
Cal., at Berkeley, 192 F.3d 1252, 1259 (9th Cir. 1999) (recognizing "animal care" as a "class
of jobs"); McKay v. Toyota Motor Mfg., U.S.A., Inc., 110 F.3d 369, 370 (6th Cir. 1997)
(recognizing "manufacturing" as a "class of jobs"); Dutcher v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, 53 F.3d
723, 727 (5th Cir. 1995) (recognizing "welding" as a "class of jobs").
75. See generally Morris v. Mayor of Balt., 437 F. Supp. 2d 508 (D. Md. 2006).
76. Id. at 515–16.
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injuries.77 In reaching its holding, the court reasoned that the "[p]laintiff’s
job expectations and training solely revolve around his career with a
specific fire department. Were plaintiff to seek a different job at this stage
in his career, he would be forced to ‘alter his career path and/or to once
again start at the bottom of a ladder.’"78 Similarly, in Howell v. New Haven
Board of Education,79 the court denied summary judgment to the school
board on a "regarded as" claim, after the district transferred a teacher with
diabetes and depression to another school with a twenty-five percent pay
reduction.80 While the court did not frame the relevant environment for the
"class of jobs" of teaching as a single school, the court focused on the
teacher’s abilities to perform his job within his original school, expressing
concern over the involuntary nature of the transfer to the less preferable
teaching post outside that school.81
Broader environment-frames for "class of jobs" within employment
fields or professions typically lead to a finding of no substantial limitation
in the major life activity of "working." In Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.,
the U.S. Supreme Court found that twin sisters with severe myopia were not
"regarded as" substantially limited in working as pilots, once their
occupation was viewed as including jobs outside the ones they applied for
as "global pilots," such as regional airline pilots and flight instructors.82
While the court did not discuss geography, the sisters’ "class of jobs" was
understood to include the locations of major airlines as well as regional
airlines and flight schools.
Several other cases involving the aviation industry provide support for
the thesis that current assessment of broad environment-frames undermines
eligibility for disability protections. The Eleventh Circuit in Witter v. Delta
Airlines,83 held that the plaintiff pilot was not "regarded as" disabled after
defining the relevant environment-frame as including both piloting and
"non-piloting jobs . . . utilizing similar training, knowledge, skills or
77. Id. at 514.
78. Id. (citing Huber v. Howard Cnty., 849 F. Supp. 407, 412 (D. Md. 1994), which
held that a volunteer firefighter whose asthma prevented him from advancing his career was
disabled under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973).
79. See generally Howell v. New Haven Bd. of Educ., 309 F. Supp. 2d 286 (D. Conn.
2004).
80. See id. at 291–92 (stating that the evidence could show that the school board
transferred plaintiff because she was perceived as mentally disabled).

81. Id.
82. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 493 (1999).
83. See generally Witter v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 138 F.3d 1366 (11th Cir. 1998).
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abilities . . . in the Atlanta area."84 Likewise, in Carter v. Ridge,85 the Fifth
Circuit defined the relevant environment-frame for a pilot as the "aviation
field," consisting of piloting and non-piloting jobs in the area.86 The court
held that the plaintiff, who suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder
(PTSD) when piloting "light piston driven" aircraft, was not disabled "in all
jobs within the aviation field or from holding a large number of jobs in
other categories of employment."87 In Duffett v. Lahood,88 the Second
Circuit employed a broad environment-frame of all air traffic control jobs
within the region and held that the plaintiff air traffic control officer may
not have been "regarded as" disabled by his employer, even though his
employer viewed him as unable to hold positions involving "live" air
traffic.89 The court did not explain, however, what a "non-live" air traffic
control job might entail.
Lower courts have reached similar results with respect to other
employment fields or professions. In Milholland v. Sumner County Board
of Education,90 the Sixth Circuit held that the plaintiff was not "regarded
as" disabled as an education administrator when she was transferred to a
teaching post at a high school in another city.91 The court stated that "a
teacher . . . is in the same class of jobs as an administrator," namely
"educators."92 In Rohan v. Networks Presentations LLC,93 the Fourth
Circuit held that the plaintiff was not "regarded as" disabled with respect to
her ability to perform as an actress regionally and nationally, though she
was unable to perform with the defendant touring theater company.94
84. Id. at 1370–71 n.2.
85. See generally Carter v. Ridge, 255 F. App’x 826 (5th Cir. 2007).
86. See id. at 830 (involving a Rehabilitation Act claim decided under the definition of
"disability" provided in the ADA).

87. Id.
88. See generally Duffett v. LaHood, 331 F. App’x 763 (2d Cir. 2009).
89. See id. at 765 (involving a Rehabilitation Act claim decided under the definition of
"disability" provided in the ADA).
90. See generally Millholland v. Sumner Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 569 F.3d 562 (6th Cir.
2009).
91. Id. at 568. Millholland was transferred from an assistant principal position in
Hendersonville, Tennessee, to a teaching position in Gallatin, Tennessee, over fifteen miles
away. Id.
92. Id. ; see also id. ("Administrators and teachers are both educators with similar
training, knowledge, skills or abilities and thus are in the same class . . . ." (citations
omitted)).
93. See generally Rohan v. Networks Presentations LLC, 375 F.3d 266 (4th Cir.
2004).
94. Id. at 278.
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Rohan suffered from severe and chronic PTSD and depression caused by
paternal sexual abuse and incest.95 Her condition was so severe that she
"act[ed] and fe[lt] as if the molestation [was] occurring at the present
moment" when she saw someone who resembled her father or someone
scolding a child.96 Such episodes could and did occur during a
performance.97 The court held that Rohan was not "regarded as"
substantially limited in the major life activity of "working" because her
employer viewed her as capable of acting and singing, even though she was
unable to tour with their theater group.98 Similarly, the Sixth Circuit in
Bryson v. Regis Corp.,99 held that a plaintiff hairstylist was not substantially
impaired in her ability to work within the cosmetology field, only from
serving as a manager of a hair salon.100
At least one court has applied an environment-frame to include jobs
available in an employment field on an entire island. The court in Fournier
v. Payco Foods Corp.101 held that the plaintiff, who was an ice cream
delivery truck driver, was not impaired in a "class of jobs" because he failed
to demonstrate that he was unable to perform delivery truck jobs in the
territory of Puerto Rico.102
Most courts have held that national
environment-frames for jobs in an employment field or profession are too
broad.103
An exception to a broad frame in an employment field or profession
limiting plaintiff protections is the Tenth Circuit case, Justice v. Crown
Cork & Seal Co.104 In Justice, the plaintiff electrician developed vertigo
95. See id. at 269 (noting Rohan’s PTSD manifested itself in chronic "dissociative
flashback episodes" accompanied by a variety of physical symptoms).
96. Id. at 269 n.1.
97. See id. at 269–70 (describing PTSD attacks during one show and multiple
rehearsals over the course of several weeks).
98. Id. at 278. Rohan had worked for a non-touring company and was experiencing
added stress while on the road. Id. at 269–70. Without any discussion of whether nontouring jobs were still available or whether they would enable Rohan to function as an
actress, however, the Fourth Circuit held that she was not substantially limited in working as
an actress. Id. at 278.
99. See generally Bryson v. Regis Corp., 498 F.3d 561 (6th Cir. 2007).
100. Id. at 567.
101. See generally Fournier v. Payco Foods Corp., 611 F. Supp. 2d 120 (D.P.R. 2009).
102. Id. at 131.
103. Webb v. Garelick Mfg. Co., 94 F.3d 484, 487 (8th Cir. 1996); Babb v. S.F.
Newspaper Agency, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21932, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 1996).
104. See generally Justice v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 527 F.3d 1080 (10th Cir. 2008).
Cf. Contra De Paoli v. Abbott Labs., 140 F.3d 668, 673–74 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that
plaintiff was significantly impaired in her ability to conduct assembly line work in Chicago,
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and balance issues after a stroke and was transferred to a janitorial job.105
The court reversed summary judgment for the employer manufacturer on
the ground that plaintiff’s transfer could indicate that he was "regarded as"
significantly restricted in his ability to perform any job in the electrical
field.106 In reaching a favorable outcome for the plaintiff, the court
assumed the relevant environment to be regional or perhaps even national,
encompassing any electrical job rather than only those jobs available at
Crown.107 One possible explanation for the different outcome in this case is
the employer’s discrimination was egregious. The court noted that the
record lacked any medical evidence that the plaintiff, who had served the
company for about ten years, could no longer perform as an electrician.108
b. Jobs with Certain Characteristics
Under the "jobs with certain characteristics" conception of "class of
jobs," the work at stake may involve features—such as temperature
conditions, social interaction, and heavy lifting—that cut across various
employment fields or professions. As with other "classes of jobs," broad
conceptions of "jobs with certain characteristics" often imply large
environment-frames, even when geography is not specifically discussed.
Plaintiff success varies when courts apply a broad environment-frame,
though broad frames typically yield negative results for plaintiffs in this
context as well. When courts use broad environment-frames, positive
outcomes for plaintiffs may occur in cases involving significant employer
misconduct.
In Murphy v. United Parcel Service,109 the U.S. Supreme Court
broadly defined "class of jobs" involving certain characteristics, holding
that a mechanic with severe hypertension was not "regarded as" disabled
when he was terminated, even though he was viewed as unable to safely
test drive commercial vehicles and obtain Department of Transportation
though she did not require an accommodation because her tendinitis and tenosynovitis
prevented her from fulfilling the essential functions of her position).
105. Justice, 527 F.3d at 1088.
106. See id. (noting it was dangerous for plaintiff to be around electrical currents). The
court also found that the defendant may have perceived the plaintiff as unable to perform a
"broad range of jobs across various classes." Id. at 1091.
107. See id. at 1088, 1091 ("The Worland plant does not, of course, represent a
microcosm of all possible jobs.").
108. Id. at 1082, 1088.
109. See generally Murphy v. UPS, 527 U.S. 516 (1999).

FRAGMENTED LIVES

207

(DOT) certification.110 Rather, the court argued, Murphy was otherwise
"generally employable as a mechanic" and could seek employment
elsewhere "as [a] diesel mechanic, automotive mechanic, gas-engine
repairer [or] gas-welding equipment mechanic," all of which did not require
DOT certification for commercial vehicles.111
Similarly, three circuits have implied the use of a broad environmentframe and denied disability protections in a "class of jobs" involving certain
characteristics. In Parker v. Port Authority of Allegheny County,112 the
Third Circuit held that a plaintiff was not "regarded as" substantially limited
in her ability to work because her employer did not feel she "was incapable
of performing all jobs that involved any degree of stress, any type or
amount of driving, and any type or degree of interaction with the public,"
only the "particular mix" of those factors involved in driving a bus.113 The
Tenth Circuit in Nealey v. Water District Number One,114 found that an
administrative assistant was not "regarded as" disabled when her employer
transferred her to a less desirable full-time administrative position for which
she received the same level of pay and benefits.115 In Boykin v. Honda
Manufacturing,116 the Eleventh Circuit held that the plaintiff with
emphysema was "fully capable of working anywhere that did not expose
him to the heat, humidity, dust, and pace of the Honda manufacturing line
and, therefore, [was] not disqualified from a class of jobs."117
The Eighth and First Circuits, however, have reached positive results
for plaintiffs using a broad environment-frame. As in Justice, these cases
involved egregious employer conduct. In Chalfant v. Titan Distribution,
Inc.,118 the Eight Circuit held that there was sufficient evidence to
demonstrate that the defendant believed the plaintiff was restricted
substantially in his ability to work in a class or range of jobs with medium-

110. Id. at 524–25.
111. Id. Presumably after the AAA, Murphy could establish disability based on a
substantial limitation of the major bodily function of circulation. AAA, Pub. L. No. 110325, § 4(a), 122 Stat. 3553, 3555–56 (2008) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2006)).
112. See generally Parker v. Port Auth. of Alleghany Cnty., 90 F. App’x 600 (3d Cir.
2004).
113. Id. at 603–05.
114. See generally Nealey v. Water Dist. No. 1., 324 F. App’x 744 (10th Cir. 2009).
115. Id. at 749.
116. See generally Boykin v. Honda Mfg. of Ala., 288 F. App’x 594 (11th Cir. 2008).
117. See id. at 597 (recognizing plaintiff was able to work two other jobs: hauling
fertilizer and concrete).
118. See generally Chalfant v. Titan Distrib., Inc., 475 F. 3d 982 (8th Cir. 2007).
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strength demands.119 The court adopted a broad environment-frame,
including all jobs within the region with those characteristics, which,
according to a vocational expert in the case, encompassed more than
seventy percent of the jobs in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles.120
Chalfant had successfully performed the job for which he applied for over
five years for a subsidiary of the company.121 Further, despite employer
Titan’s statements, the position did not involve heavy lifting.122 In addition,
Chalfant was told he failed his physical examination without medical
proof.123 Similarly, in Sensing v. Outback Steakhouse of Florida, LLC,124
the First Circuit employed a broad environment-frame in holding that a
plaintiff was substantially limited in "her ability to work in a broad class of
jobs that would have required her to be on her feet."125 Sensing, who
worked in the take-out section of the restaurant and had twice been
employee of the month, was demoted to "light duty work" at half the pay
and a third of the hours, after taking a day and a half approved leave for
complications from multiple sclerosis.126
2. "Broad Range of Jobs"
An individual may also demonstrate a substantial limitation of the
major life activity of "working" by proving an inability to perform "a broad
range of jobs . . . within [the] geographical area."127 "Broad range of jobs"
may include jobs at a particular employer location or within a company
with multiple locations. Similar to "class of jobs" cases, as the
environment-frame becomes larger, plaintiffs’ ability to establish a
substantial limitation in "working" decreases.

119. Id. at 989.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 986.
122. Id. at 989.
123. Id. at 987.
124. See generally Sensing v. Outback Steakhouse of Fla., LLC, 575 F.3d 145 (1st Cir.
2009).
125. Id. at 156.
126. Id. at 148–50. The court remanded on the issue of whether Sensing was
constructively discharged. Id. at 159–60.
127. Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the ADA, 29
C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii)(C) (2010).
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a. Jobs at a Particular Employer Location
Employment at a particular geographic location is the smallest
environment-frame for "broad range of jobs." As with "class of jobs,"
plaintiffs are often considered part of the protected class when a court looks
to jobs at a particular employer location. Even within the "particular
employer location" category of "broad range of jobs," however, courts may
construct narrow or broad frames. In cases where plaintiffs are not granted
protected class status, courts frequently adopt a broad reading of available
jobs within an employer location.
A number of courts have examined whether an employee is "regarded
as" incapable of performing any job at a specific location for the defendant
employer and thereby substantially limited in a "broad range of jobs." The
Sixth and Tenth Circuits have recognized that failing to offer a plaintiff any
job at a particular location may be evidence that the employer regards the
plaintiff as disabled. In Beery v. Associated Hygiene Products, LLC,128 the
Sixth Circuit reversed summary judgment for the employer because a jury
could find that the company was "mistaken in its belief that [claimant’s]
back condition would indefinitely prevent him from doing any available
jobs at the warehouse."129 In Jones v. United Parcel Service, Inc.,130 the
Tenth Circuit, finding for the defendant on unrelated grounds, recognized
that "when an employer is hiring for a broad range of jobs in the relevant
geographical area, its decision not to offer an employee one of a broad
range of company jobs may be relevant evidence of its perception of that
employee’s abilities."131 In Jones, the plaintiff, who was a package vehicle
driver, was not offered another job within a particular location of U.P.S.
after he injured his shoulder and two doctors assigned him permanent
weight lifting restrictions.132 Similarly, the Sixth Circuit held in Burns v.
128. See generally Beery v. Associated Hygiene Prods., LLC, 243 F. App’x 129 (6th
Cir. 2007).

129. See id. at 134 (analyzing the disability claim under the Ohio Civil Rights Act,
which applies the same standards as the ADA). The court took a similar view in Wysong v.
Dow Chemical Co., 503 F.3d 441, 443 (6th Cir. 2007), concluding that a reasonable jury
could find that the defendant employer regarded the plaintiff as unable to perform any jobs
in its facility due to her alleged dependency on pain killers. Id. Dow sent the plaintiff a
letter stating that she was "unfit to return to work" and did not offer her another position
within the facility. Id. at 453; see also Collins v. Yellow Freight Sys. Inc., 93 F. App’x 854,
861 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that plaintiff with a back injury was "regarded as" disabled
because he was perceived as unable to perform certain manual labor jobs).
130. See generally Jones v. UPS, 502 F.3d 1176 (10th Cir. 2007).
131. Id. at 1192.
132. Id. at 1181.
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Coca-Cola Enterprises,133 that the plaintiff product deliverer was
substantially limited in "working" in a "broad range of jobs" because his
back injury prevented him from performing at least fifty percent of the jobs
available to him at the Knoxville bottling company.134
The Fifth and Seventh Circuits, however, have found for defendants
after broadly constructing the range of jobs available at a particular
location. In Squibb v. Memorial Medical Center,135 the Seventh Circuit
held that the plaintiff nurse, who was incapable of performing "patient care"
nursing jobs, was not disabled because she failed to demonstrate that she
was unable to perform "non-patient care" nursing jobs for her hospital
employer.136 Similarly, in Moreno v. Brownlee,137 the Fifth Circuit held
that the plaintiff with carpal tunnel syndrome was not substantially limited
in performing jobs at an Army base, only the particular job of "target device
servicer."138 However, the Army then argued that it did not have a position
at the base to which to reassign him that would avoid "repetitive, stressful
work with his hands and wrists, and . . . lift[ing] objects weighing more
than fifteen pounds."139
b. Jobs Within a Company
Where a company exists in more than one location, all jobs within the
company throughout the various locations may serve as the environmentframe for a "broad range of jobs." The size of this type of environmentframe necessarily depends on the size of the employer and how employers
view available jobs within the company, though the frame is usually
relatively broad. When courts use this environment-frame, results are
typically less favorable for plaintiffs than with a frame including a single
location.
A number of circuits have held that plaintiffs are not disabled in the
major life activity of "working" with respect to a "broad range of jobs"
133. See generally Burns v. Coca-Cola Enter., 222 F.3d 247 (6th Cir. 2000).
134. Id. at 256. The court also held, however, that the plaintiff was not entitled to a
remedy because he failed to follow the company’s transfer-request policy in seeking his
accommodation. Id.
135. See generally Squibb v. Mem’l Med. Ctr., 497 F.3d 775 (7th Cir. 2007).
136. Id. at 783.
137. See generally Moreno v. Brownlee, 85 F. App’x 23 (5th Cir. 2004).
138. Id. at 27–28.
139. Id. at 24.
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within a company. For example, in the recent Eighth Circuit decision
McLain v. Anderson Corp.,140 the court held that the defendant did not
regard the plaintiff truck driver as substantially limited in a broad range of
jobs when he was unable to perform jobs regularly requiring unloading but
could manage "run off" delivery jobs or obtain further training and
qualification and assume an inter-state driving position.141 The plaintiff
could also perform non-driving jobs in the Logistics Department or
Renewal Center, though no such jobs were available.142 Likewise, in
Daugherty v. Sajar Plastics, Inc.,143 the Sixth Circuit held that the
defendant did not regard the plaintiff, who used narcotics to manage pain,
as unable to perform all maintenance jobs within the company, only those
involving "dangerous machinery."144 In DePrisco v. Delta Air Lines,
Inc.,145 the same court held that a reservation sales agent, whose vertigo
impaired her job performance, could serve as a flight or Crown Room
attendant.146 Delta had openings for both posts within the company but
chose not to hire the plaintiff.147 The Fifth Circuit in Windly v. Hightower
Oil Co.,148 held that the plaintiff was not "regarded as" substantially limited
in a "broad range of jobs" because her employer only viewed her as
incapable of supervising some "particularly demanding" convenience
stores, not convenience stores generally.149 The plaintiff was not, however,
offered an alternative work location.150 Along similar lines, courts have
held that while plaintiffs may be substantially limited in performing the
duties of "police officer," they are not so limited in the "broad range of
jobs" included in "law enforcement" within the police force.151
140. See generally McLain v. Anderson Corp., 567 F.3d 956 (8th Cir. 2009).
141. See id. at 968 (analyzing the disability claim under the Minnesota Human Rights
Act, which applies the same standards as the ADA). "‘Run-off’ deliveries . . . are
unscheduled, smaller deliveries to retail stores of lumberyards." Id. at 959. An employee
making run-off deliveries is on-call and must respond to jobs as they arise. Id. at 963.
142. Id. at 968.
143. See generally Daugherty v. Sajar Plastics, Inc., 544 F.3d 696 (6th Cir. 2008).
144. See id. at 706 (analyzing the disability claim under an Ohio Civil Rights Act,
which applies the same standards as the ADA).
145. See generally DePrisco v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 90 F. App’x 790 (6th Cir. 2004).
146. Id. at 794–95.
147. Id. at 793.
148. See generally Windly v. Hightower Oil Co., 91 F. App’x 330 (5th Cir. 2004).
149. Id. at 332–33.
150. Id. at 331.
151. See, e.g., Epps v. City of Pine Lawn, 353 F.3d 588, 590–92 (8th Cir. 2003)
(finding plaintiff could serve as a detective or elsewhere in the police department); Rossbach
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Plaintiffs have recovered in only a couple of cases when the
environment-frame of "jobs within a company" extended to more than one
location. These cases involved plaintiffs with a significant limitation in the
ability to perform a "broad range of jobs." In Eshelman v. Agere Systems,
Inc.,152 the Third Circuit found that a woman with chemotherapy-induced
memory loss was "regarded as" disabled when she was not assigned to a job
in another city in the state following corporate restructuring.153 The
Seventh Circuit in Dalton v. Subaru-Isuzu Automotive, Inc.,154 held that a
"rational trier of fact could reasonably find that the substantial percentage
reductions [thirty-five to eighty-nine percent] in the broad range of jobs
available to [the impaired "production associate"] plaintiffs [in Tippecanoe
County, Indiana] . . . substantially limited them in the major life activity of
working."155

3. Conclusion
The "working" cases support the thesis that generally the broader the
environment-frame used for assessing "substantial limitation," the less
likely a plaintiff will demonstrate the requisite limitation of a major life
activity and be considered part of the protected class. Courts will instead
view the plaintiff as being able to function in some portion of the broad
environment and thus as not disabled.
These cases also indicate that the varying construction of environmentframes leads to inconsistent results for plaintiffs. For example, several
courts have held that "police officer" is too narrow a field to constitute a
"class of jobs" and have used instead "law enforcement" jobs as the
environment for framing the ability to work.156 However, other courts have
held that a plaintiff’s ADA claim may succeed by proving that an employer
v. City of Miami, 371 F.3d 1354, 1360–61 (11th Cir. 2004) ("‘[P]olice officer’ is too narrow
a range of jobs to constitute a ‘class of jobs’ as that term is defined in the EEOC
regulations."); cf. Sheehan v. City of Gloucester, 321 F.3d 21, 25–26 (1st Cir. 2003) (noting
plaintiff could serve as a security guard).
152. See generally Eshelman v. Agere Syst., Inc., 554 F.3d 426 (3d Cir. 2009).
153. See id. at 435–36 (analyzing the disability claims under the Pennsylvania Human
Relations Act, which applies the same standards as the ADA).
154. See generally Dalton v. Subaru-Isuzu Auto., Inc., 141 F.3d 667 (7th Cir. 1998).
155. Id. at 676.
156. See supra note 151 (listing cases in which plaintiffs’ inability to continue serving
as police officers did not disqualify them from a "class of jobs" or a "broad range of jobs"
within law enforcement).
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viewed the claimant as substantially limited in the ability to work as a
firefighter.157 Such inconsistent use of environment-frames makes it
difficult for plaintiffs to know what type of evidence they must offer in
order to prevail on a major life activity of "working" claim.158 The
environment-frame chosen also significantly alters plaintiffs’ evidentiary
burden. One can assume that it is easier for plaintiffs to produce evidence
that they are substantially limited in the ability to work in a narrow
environment, which only considers their capability to perform a select
number of jobs, than in a broad environment compassing many
employment possibilities.
III. Environment-Framing and Remedy
Like the statutory test for disability eligibility, determining whether an
individual is entitled to a remedy implies the need to define and assess the
environment in which an individual is functioning. Courts look to
workplaces,159 transportation vehicles and facilities,160 other places of
public service,161 and places of public accommodation162 to determine
whether alteration of physical spaces, or the activities occurring within
these spaces, would improve access for individuals with disabilities. As in
the eligibility context, courts define environment-frames for remedy on an
ad hoc basis.163 Unlike environment-frame analysis for eligibility, however,
courts typically adopt narrow environment-frames when determining
entitlement to remedy.164 These narrow frames may limit or preclude a

157. See Morris v. Mayor of Balt., 437 F. Supp. 2d 508, 515 (D. Md. 2006) (concluding
that a firefighter who had served for thirty years in the same fire department could be
impaired in a "class of jobs" due to the difficulty of seeking a job at another fire department
at such a late stage in his career); see also Huber v. Howard Cnty., 849 F. Supp. 407, 412 (D.
Md. 1994) (finding that "because Huber is disqualified from advancing the firefighter career
for which he is well trained and in which he has an extensive background, his disability is
substantially limiting as to being a career firefighter").
158. See, e.g., Dillon v. Mountain Coal Co., 569 F.3d 1215, 1220 (10th Cir. 2009)
(noting that plaintiff’s claim failed because he did not describe other jobs in the area that fell
within the class of mining jobs).
159. ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (2006).
160. Id. §§ 12142, 12143(a), 12144, 12146, 12147, 12182(b)(2)(B)–(C), 12184(a)–(b).
161. Id. §§ 12131–32.
162. Id. §§ 12182(a)–(b), 12183.
163. Infra Part III.A.–B.
164. Infra Part III.A.–B.
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remedy.165 Thus, at both ends of disability analysis—eligibility and
remedy—courts use different environment-frames to limit protection under
the ADA.
This Part addresses the role of environment-framing and remedy,
specifically reasonable accommodation or other modification. Subpart A
provides a brief overview of judicial trends for such injunctive relief. Cases
indicate that narrow frames are often used, and they limit or undermine
remedy. When broad frames are used, plaintiffs typically receive
accommodation or other modification. Subpart B focuses on Title II and
reasonable modification within prisons and jails. I chose to explore this
context in detail because it demonstrates that, even within a clearly defined
finite space, courts may frame environments in numerous ways and reach
disparate outcomes.166
A. Reasonable Accommodation and Other Modification
Once an individual is deemed eligible for disability protections, courts
must assess whether she is entitled to a remedy.167 Under Title I, a plaintiff
is entitled to reasonable accommodation in the workplace, including that
necessary to fulfill the essential functions of her job.168 Titles II and III
require that a plaintiff receive structural or other modification to allow
access to transportation, other public services, and places of public
accommodation.169 All requested accommodation or other modification is
165. Infra Part III.A.–B.
166. Other spaces may also be clearly defined and finite, of course—such as some
workspaces—though they may be more difficult to compare, as they are likely subject to
greater variation.
167. For a discussion of the stages of disability analysis under the ADA, see Ani B.
Satz, A Jurisprudence of Dysfunction: On the Role of "Normal Species Functioning" in
Disability Analysis, 6 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 221, 248–50 (2006).
168. ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (2006).
[R]easonable accommodation [includes]: (A) making existing facilities used by
employees readily accessible to and useable by individuals with disabilities; and
(B) job restructuring, reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or
modification of equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications
of examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of qualified readers
or interpreters, and other similar accommodations . . . .
Id. Accommodation supports equality of opportunity with respect to job applications, work
performance (the ability to fulfill the essential functions of one’s job), and the benefits and
privileges of employment. Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of
the ADA, 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(o)(1), 1630.9 (2010).
169. ADA §§ 12131–32, 12142, 12143(a), 12144, 12146, 12147 (Title II); id.
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subject to the affirmative defenses of "undue hardship"170 and "direct
threat."171
The case law indicates a couple of trends. Overall, the narrower the
environment assessed, the less likely an individual will receive a desired
accommodation or other modification.172 This is because she will be
§§ 12182(a)–(b), 12183, 12184(a)–(b) (Title III).
170. See id. § 12111(10) (defining "undue hardship" under Title I as "requiring
significant difficulty or expense," measured by "the nature and cost of the accommodation"
and the financial resources and impact of the accommodation on the facility making the
accommodation as well as the covered entity, if different). The defense varies slightly for
Titles II and III. Infra notes 284–86 and accompanying text.
171. See ADA § 12113(b) ("[A]n individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health
and safety of other individuals in the workplace"); see also Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S.
624, 649 (1998) (holding that a "direct threat" is one that poses a "significant risk" to others
based on "medical and other objective evidence"). The direct threat defense was extended to
harm to self in Chevron v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 80 (2002).
172. Compare Shannon v. Postmaster Gen. of U.S. Postal Serv., 335 F. App’x 21, 24–
36 (11th Cir. 2009) (considering an environment of a particular workplace and finding that
no accommodation was required), Mobley v. Allstate Ins. Co., 531 F.3d 539, 546–57 (7th
Cir. 2008) (same), Molski v. Foley Estates Vineyard, 521 F.3d 1043, 1050 (9th Cir. 2008)
(considering an environment of the interior of a wine-tasting room but not the space leading
to the room and finding that modification of the room, but not a ramp to the room, was
required), Tucker v. Tennessee, 539 F.3d 526, 540–42 (6th Cir. 2008) (considering an
environment of a single jail and finding that no modification was required), Norman v. Tex.
Dep’t of Crim. Justice, 293 F. App’x 285, 288 (5th Cir. 2008) (considering an environment
of a single prison and finding that no modification was required), Brown v. City of
Cleveland, 294 F. App’x 226, 232–34 (6th Cir. 2008) (considering an environment of a
particular workplace and finding that no accommodation was required), Bircoll v. MiamiDade Cnty., 480 F.3d 1072, 1085–89 (11th Cir. 2007) (considering environments of a
specific location of a police stop and a single police station and finding that no modification
was required in either location), Ozlek v. Potter, 259 F. App’x 417, 420–21 (3d Cir. 2007)
(considering an environment of a particular workplace and finding that no accommodation
was required), and Garthright-Dietrich v. Atlanta Landmarks, Inc., 452 F.3d 1269, 1275
(11th Cir. 2006) (considering an environment of a particular theater and finding that no
modification was required), with Simmons v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 340 F. App’x 24, 27–
28 (2d Cir. 2009) (considering an environment of all jobs within a company and finding that
an accommodation was required), Doran v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 524 F.3d 1034, 1043 (9th Cir.
2008) (considering an environment of Seven Eleven stores within 550 miles of plaintiff’s
residence and finding that plaintiff had standing to challenge access barriers), Am. Council
of the Blind v. Paulson, 525 F.3d 1256, 1268, 1274 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (considering all users of
money, not only sighted individuals, and finding that modification was required), Miller v.
Cal. Speedway Corp., 536 F.3d 1020, 1028 (9th Cir. 2008) (considering the spectator "line
of sight" throughout the speedway rather than in designated areas and finding that
modification was required), Schwarz v. City of Treasure Island, 544 F.3d 1201, 1226–28
(11th Cir. 2008) (considering the city of Treasure Island and finding that modification was
required), Woodruff v. Sch. Bd. of Seminole Cnty., 304 F. App’x 795, 800 (11th Cir. 2008)
(considering an entire school district and finding that accommodation may be required),
Bacon v. City of Richmond, 475 F.3d 633, 639 (4th Cir. 2007) (same), and Woodruff v.
Peters, 482 F.3d 521, 527–28 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (considering the workplace and home and
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viewed as functional within a small, legally-protected area, such as a
portion of a workplace or place of public accommodation.173 In addition,
courts often adopt narrow environment-frames for reasonable
accommodation and other modification, and, in these cases, plaintiffs are
usually denied a remedy.174 Interestingly, following the adoption of the
AAA, courts must use the narrowest frame—actually no frame—to assess

finding that accommodation was required).
173. See Shannon v. Postmaster Gen. of the U.S. Postal Serv., 335 F. App’x 21, 24–26
(11th Cir. 2009) (considering a particular workplace); Mobley v. Allstate Ins. Co., 531 F.3d
539, 546–47 (7th Cir. 2008) (same); Molski v. Foley Estates Vineyard & Winery, LLC., 531
F.3d 1043, 1050 (9th Cir. 2008) (considering the interior of a wine-tasting room but not the
space leading to the room); Tucker v. Tennessee, 539 F.3d 526, 540–42 (6th Cir. 2008)
(considering a single jail); Norman v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Justice, 293 F. App’x 285, 288
(5th Cir. 2008) (considering a single prison); Brown v. City of Cleveland, 294 F. App’x 226,
232–34 (6th Cir. 2008) (considering a particular workplace); Bircoll v. Miami-Dade Cnty.,
480 F.3d 1072, 1085–89 (11th Cir. 2007) (considering the specific location of a police stop
and a single police station); Ozlek v. Potter, 259 F. App’x 417, 420–21 (3rd Cir. 2007)
(considering a particular workplace); Garthright-Dietrich v. Atlanta Landmarks, Inc., 452
F.3d 1269, 1275 (11th Cir. 2006) (considering a particular theater).
174. See Shannon v. Postmaster Gen. of the U.S. Postal Serv., 335 F. App’x 21, 24–26
(11th Cir. 2009) (considering a particular workplace and finding no accommodation was
required); Mobley v. Allstate Ins. Co., 531 F.3d 539, 546–57 (7th Cir. 2008) (same); Molski
v. Foley Estates Vineyard & Winery, LLC., 531 F.3d 1043, 1050 (9th Cir. 2008)
(considering the interior of a wine-tasting room and finding that modification of the room
but not a ramp to the room was required); Tucker v. Tennessee, 539 F.3d 526, 540–42 (6th
Cir. 2008) (considering a single jail and finding that no modification was required); Norman
v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 293 F. App’x 285, 288 (5th Cir. 2008) (considering a
single prison and finding that no modification was required); Brown v. City of Cleveland,
294 F. App’x 226, 232–34 (6th Cir. 2008) (considering a particular workplace and finding
that no accommodation was required); Bircoll v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 480 F.3d 1072, 1085–
89 (11th Cir. 2007) (considering the specific location of a police stop and a single police
station and finding that no modification was required in either location); Ozlek v. Potter, 259
F. App’x 417, 420–21 (3d Cir. 2007) (considering a particular workplace and finding that no
accommodation was required); Garthright-Dietrich v. Atlanta Landmarks, Inc., 452 F.3d
1269, 1275 (11th Cir. 2006) (considering a particular theater and finding that no
modification was required).
Even in instances where a remedy is provided, the ADA does not require that a plaintiff
receive an accommodation that facilitates a preferred mode of functioning, which arguably
exacerbates the problem of obtaining a meaningful remedy. See ADA, 42 U.S.C.
§ 12111(10) (2006) (discussing "the" or "an," meaning "one" accommodation); see also
Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the ADA, 29 C.F.R. § 1630
app., 1630.9 (2010) ("[T]he employer providing the accommodation has the ultimate
discretion to choose between effective accommodations.").
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individuals who are "regarded as" disabled175 because they are no longer
entitled to accommodation.176
The next Subpart explores in detail the effects of narrow environmentframing in the remedy context, using prisons and jails as examples.
B. Incarceration and the Finite Environment
Prisons and jails, covered under Title II of the ADA, provide a
particularly good example of the effects of environment-framing on
requested modification.177 Such facilities constitute finite environments
with substantial similarities, limiting the ways environment-frames may be
drawn.178 Even within the confined environments of prisons or jails,
judicial construction of environment-frames for remedy purposes varies
significantly.
This Part will examine the structural and non-structural modification
required to access prison services, programs, and activities under Title II.179
175. AAA, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 4(a), 122 Stat. 3553, 3555–56 (2008) (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 12102 (2006)).
176. Id. Prior to the AAA, courts determined the relevant environment-frame for
"regarded as" plaintiffs, and it was usually narrow. Supra Part II.B.
177. Title II of the ADA applies to public services. ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12131–32
(2006). The U.S. Supreme Court has held that Title II covers prisoners in state correctional
institutions. Pa. Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 210 (1998). Thus, if a prisoner is
both disabled and an otherwise qualified individual, a state prison may not deny services,
programs, or activities merely because the prisoner has a disability. ADA § 12132; see also
Mason v. Corr. Med. Servs., Inc., 559 F.3d 880, 886 (8th Cir. 2009) (noting that prisoners
who are qualified individuals with a disability are entitled to meaningful access to prison
benefits).
178. A prisoner’s ability to function is examined within the confines and conditions of
prison. See, e.g. , Shedlock v. Dep’t of Corr., 818 N.E.2d 1022, 1030 (Mass. 2004)
(examining a prisoner’s ability to move to different areas of the prison to determine whether
he is substantially limited in his ability to walk); Purcell v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 1998 WL
10236, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 9, 1998) (examining an inmate’s ability to interact with fellow
prisoners and prison staff to determine whether he is substantially limited in the major life
activity of communicating). Prisoners are necessarily limited in the ability to walk, work,
and communicate with others. For this reason, courts often place great weight on a
prisoner’s medical reports. See, e.g. , id. (relying on several doctors’ reports to determine
how seriously plaintiff prisoner’s Tourette’s Syndrome limited his ability to communicate).
179. Title II states that "no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reasons of
such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services,
programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by such entity."
ADA § 12132. The regulations supporting Title II require that "[a] public entity, in
providing any aid, benefit, or service, may not . . . on the basis of disability . . . [a]fford a
qualified individual with a disability an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the aid,
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Federal cases pertaining to structural modification may be divided into
those involving environment-frames that consist of: cells, areas of a prison
or jail extending beyond a cell, and an entire prison or jail. Cases
pertaining to access that do not require structural modification rely on
environments constructed relative to people: a single disabled inmate (a
proxy for one prison or jail), disabled and non-disabled inmates within a
prison or jail (one prison or jail), and disabled and non-disabled inmates
within regional prisons (prisons or jails within a region). As with other
modification cases, the broader the environment-frame courts use, the
larger the accessible space required and the less interrupted disability
protections become.
1. Requests for Structural Modification
Under Title II, inmates may request modification to access certain
physical spaces of a prison or jail for services, programs, and activities.180
Three groups of environment-frames emerge in ADA jurisprudence
involving requests for structural modification: a prison or jail cell,
particular areas beyond a cell, and an entire facility. Courts most often
interpret Title II to require modification in the first two (narrower) contexts.
As a result, disability protections attach only to certain prison or jail areas.
Some courts view the relevant environment for assessment as a cell,
and deny requests for access outside that area. For example, in Baribeau v.
City of Minneapolis,181 plaintiff inmate’s prosthetic leg was confiscated
while he was in jail.182 Without the leg, the plaintiff could not access some
parts of the jail, including the basketball court, where he stated he "might
have played [basketball]."183 The court held that providing plaintiff with a
wheelchair and an ADA-compliant cell was sufficient.184 Similarly, in
Purcell v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections,185 the court found that
benefit, or service that is not equal to that afforded others." Nondiscrimination on the Basis
of Disability in State & Local Gov’t Servs., 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(1)(ii) (2010).
180. See United States v. Georgia (Goodman), 546 U.S. 151, 160 n.* (2006) (Stevens,
J., concurring) (finding it is unclear "whether certain of [plaintiff’s] claims are even covered
by Title II . . . [such as] lack of access to . . . ‘television, phone calls, [and] entertainment’").
181. See generally Baribeau v. City of Minneapolis, 596 F.3d 465 (8th Cir. 2010).
182. Id. at 472.
183. Id. at 485.
184. Id. at 484.
185. See generally Purcell v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., No. Civ. A. 95-6720, 1998 WL 10236,
at *1 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 9, 1998).
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the appropriate modification for a prisoner with joint disease and Tourette’s
Syndrome was to "allow[] him to remain in a handicapped-accessible
cell."186
Other courts frame the environment for prison access as extending
beyond a prison cell but not to a complete prison. When the relevant prison
environment is more broadly construed, prisoners have greater success with
modification claims. A number of cases deal with shower facilities located
outside prison cells. In Outlaw v. City of Dothan,187 the court held that the
shower in the city jail must be both accessible and available to an inmate
who wears an artificial leg and has burns on his body that require him to
shower frequently.188 Several other cases recognize similar claims with
respect to accessing or using shower facilities.189 In United States v.
Georgia (Goodman),190 the U.S. Supreme Court assumed without deciding
that lack of disability accessible shower and toilet facilities were among the
Eighth Amendment violations experienced by the plaintiff.191 The
Petitioner’s brief in the case indicates that the plaintiff was unable to
shower for over two years.192
Plaintiffs also receive injunctive relief in cases when courts draw
environment-frames to include other areas of a prison outside a cell. In

186. Id. at *9. This was, however, the modification the plaintiff sought with respect to
his verbal and motor tics. Id.
187. See generally Outlaw v. City of Dothan, No. CV-92-A-1219-S, 1993 WL 735802
(M.D. Ala. Apr. 27, 1993).
188. Id. at *4.
189. See, e.g., Kiman v. N.H. Dep’t of Corr., 451 F.3d 274, 288 (1st Cir. 2006) (holding
that plaintiff presented admissible evidence regarding his access to a shower chair and
facilities, making summary judgment inappropriate); Schmidt v. Odell, 64 F. Supp. 2d 1014,
1032–33 (D. Kan. 1999) ("[T]here is a genuine issue of fact as to whether the defendants
failed to make reasonable accommodation for plaintiff’s disability, including by . . . failing
to timely provide a shower chair."); Kaufman v. Carter, 952 F. Supp. 520, 532–33 (D. Mich.
1996) (denying defendant’s motion for summary judgment based on evidence that the prison
failed to provide plaintiff with a shower chair or accessible shower facilities); Saunders v.
Horn, 959 F. Supp. 689, 698 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (allowing inmate to proceed on claim that the
prison did not provide readily accessible bathroom and shower facilities).
190. See generally United States v. Georgia (Goodman), 546 U.S. 151 (2006).
191. Id. at 159. The Court did not declare which of the plaintiff’s claims violated Title
II. Id.
192. Brief for Petitioner Goodman at 3, Goodman, 546 U.S. at 151 (No. 04-1236),
http://works.bepress.com/samuel_bagenstos/19/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2011) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review). The Court takes note that Goodman "had been forced to
sit in his own feces and urine while prison officials refused to assist him in cleaning up the
waste." Goodman, 546 U.S. at 155.
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Owens v. Chester County,193 plaintiff prisoner was allowed to use his
crutches only in certain areas of the prison.194 The court held that the prison
must make crutches available to the plaintiff "when appropriate," implying
some areas of the prison need not be accessed.195 The court identified the
dining area as an appropriate place of access.196 Prisoner access to a dining
hall was also upheld in Crawford v. Indiana Department of Corrections.197
In addition, courts may view Title II as requiring access to recreation
areas.198
Only the Seventh and Ninth Circuits have adopted an environmentframe of most, if not an entire, prison. Within this broad environmentframe, both circuits held that plaintiffs were entitled to the modification
they sought. In Love v. Westville Correctional Center,199 a quadriplegic
prisoner plaintiff housed in an infirmary claimed "he was unable to use the
prison’s recreational facilities, its dining hall, the visitation facilities that
were open to the general inmate population, and that he was unable to
participate in [programs]" that were available in the main prison area.200
The court upheld a decision for the plaintiff, finding that he was illegally
denied access to a number of programs that were available in the main
quarters of the prison but not the infirmary unit.201 Pierce v. County of
Orange202 takes perhaps the broadest view of any prison access case. The
county housed mobility and dexterity-impaired detainees in a separate jail
and denied them access to various features of their cells and numerous areas
of the jail, including common spaces such as showers, dining halls, and
recreation areas.203 The court ordered that the jail remove barriers to cells,
bathrooms, showers, exercise areas, day rooms, dining rooms, and other
193. See generally Owens v. Chester Cnty., CIV. A. 97-1344, 2000 WL 116069 (E.D.
Pa. Jan. 31, 2000).
194. Id. at *9.
195. Id. at *12.
196. Id. at *12 n.8.
197. Crawford v. Ind. Dep’t of Corr., 115 F.3d 481, 483 (7th Cir. 1997), abrogated on
other grounds by Erickson v. Bd. of Gov. of State Coll. & Univ. for N. Ill. Univ., 207 F.3d
945 (7th Cir. 2000).
198. See, e.g., Schmidt v. Odell, 64 F. Supp. 2d 1014, 1033 (D. Kan. 1999) (holding
that plaintiff was entitled to access prison recreation areas).
199. See generally Love v. Westville Corr. Ctr., 103 F.3d 558 (7th Cir. 1996).
200. Id. at 558–59.
201. Id. at 560 (providing examples of church services, substance abuse programs, and
college classes).
202. Pierce v. Cnty. of Orange, 526 F.3d 1190 (9th Cir. 2008).
203. Id. at 1214–20.
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areas.204 Courts adopt a similar range of environment-frames when
considering access to prison or jail services, programs, or activities that do
not require modification of spaces.
2. Requests for Other Modification
When disabled inmates request modification that does not alter the
physical environment of a prison or jail, courts apply a range of
environment-frames measured relative to other inmates to determine access
to services, programs, and activities. The DOJ regulations state that
disabled inmates must have access "equal to that afforded other[]
[inmates]."205 Environments are measured relative to an individual disabled
inmate (a single facility), a particular facility’s inmate population (a single
facility), or the inmate population of a region (prisons or jails in a region).
Environment-frames within a single facility may vary in scope. When an
inmate’s access to services is considered in isolation, the frame often does
not extend much beyond that individual’s prison cell, whereas when a
comparison is made to the services received by other prisoners, the
environment considered usually includes more, if not all, of the prison. As
with requests for structural modification, the smaller the environmentframe, the more likely an inmate will be denied her requested modification.
As the environment-frame becomes larger, so do an inmate’s chances for
greater prison or jail access.
Some courts consider an inmate’s access to services in isolation, rather
than compared to other inmates. These courts employ the narrowest
version of a single prison environment-frame for remedy purposes, and
plaintiffs are denied injunctive relief. In Mason v. Correctional Medical
Services, Inc.,206 the court held that a prisoner who went blind as an inmate
had sufficient access to reading and other benefits when the prison provided
him an inmate reader as well as access to a tape recorder.207 The plaintiff
had requested professional instruction about how to complete daily tasks
throughout the prison with his impairment and tools to enable him to use
the library, including training in Braille or computer software that makes

204. Id. at 1226.
205. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in State & Local Gov’t Servs., 28
C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(1)(ii) (2010).
206. See generally Mason v. Corr. Med. Servs., Inc., 559 F.3d 880 (8th Cir. 2009).
207. Id. at 887.
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written work audible.208 The court in Douglas v. Gusman209 held that a
prison’s failure to provide a telephone typewriter device or closed
captioning television to a deaf prisoner, while providing unlimited access to
phones as well as television privileges to other prisoners, did not violate
Title II of the ADA.210 Allowing the prisoner to make "one call in the
daytime and one call in the evening, seven days a week for about six weeks,
provided him with meaningful access to the telephone as a matter of
law."211
Several courts compare a plaintiff inmate’s situation with that of nondisabled inmates in the same prison. Plaintiffs are granted requested
modification under this broader construction of the single prison
environment-frame. The Third Circuit held with respect to a deaf prisoner
that "public entities [must] take ‘appropriate steps’ to ensure that
communication with a disabled person is as effective as communication
with others."212 A number of lower federal courts adopt a similar view. In
Clarkson v. Coughlin,213 the court granted summary judgment to plaintiff
prisoners who were hearing impaired because the prison did not provide
them the same opportunity as non-disabled prisoners to participate in
educational, vocational, and rehabilitative classes.214 The court noted that
the prison excluded disabled inmates from twenty-six academic and
vocational programs that were available to non-disabled inmates.215 In
Garcia v. Taylor,216 the court held that summary judgment was not
appropriate when the prison denied the plaintiff, who was hearing impaired,

208.
209.
210.
211.

Id. at 887–88.
See generally Douglas v. Gusman, 567 F. Supp. 2d 877 (E.D. La. 2008).
Id. at 890.
Id.

212. Chisolm v. McManimon, 275 F.3d 315, 325 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing
Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in State & Local Gov’t Servs., 28 C.F.R.
§ 35.160(a) (1991)). The regulations were recently amended to state, "[a] public entity shall
take appropriate steps to ensure that communication with applicants, participants, members
of the public, and companions with disabilities are as effective as communications with
others." Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in State & Local Gov’t Servs., 28
C.F.R. § 35.160(a) (2010).
213. See generally Clarkson v. Coughlin, 898 F. Supp. 1019 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
214. Id. at 1038, 1047.
215. Id. at 1047.
216. See generally Garcia v. Taylor, No. 4:07-cv-474-SPM/WCS, 2009 WL 2496521
(N.D. Fla. Aug. 11, 2009).
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access to the purchase and use of a personal radio device to listen to
television like non-disabled inmates.217
The court in Pierce, which involved structural as well as other
modification requests, adopted an even broader environment-frame of the
jails within that county.218 The court held that the county jail illegally
denied inmates the benefit of educational, rehabilitative, and recreational
programs; services; and activities available at other county jails to ablebodied inmates.219 Other courts have rejected this broad environment-frame
of prisons or jails in the region, however, by arguing that there is no right
"for a [disabled] inmate to demand that the prison . . . implement a specific
type of [service, program, or activity] which is not already available [nor
does the ADA] create any right for an inmate to be housed at a specific
prison [where such opportunities are available]."220
The Pierce and Baribeau cases stand in stark contrast and demonstrate
the significant role of environment-framing in determining access to prison
environments, services, and programs for disabled inmates. In Baribeau
(discussed in Part III.A.1), providing a mobility-impaired inmate with an
ADA compliant cell was deemed a sufficient modification.221 In Pierce, the
court provided plaintiffs with access to a broad range of services and
programs available to non-disabled inmates within the county.222 As with
other reasonable accommodation or modification cases, the breadth of the
environment-frame chosen by courts in the prison and jail cases determines
judicial outcomes, with favorable plaintiff decisions resulting from use of
broad environment-frames.
C. Harms of Current Approach to Assessing Environment: Remedy and
Possible Constitutional Implications
As the prison and jail cases indicate, when courts frame environments
for modification purposes narrowly, plaintiffs are often unable to obtain a
remedy. This suggests that lowering the threshold for disability eligibility
alone will not address lack of protections for individuals with disabilities.
217. Id. at *11.
218. Pierce v. Cnty. of Orange, 526 F.3d 1190, 1221 (9th Cir. 2008).
219. Id. at 1220–21, 1226.
220. Garrett v. Angelone, 940 F. Supp. 933, 942 (W.D. Va. 1996), aj’d, 107 F.3d 865
(4th Cir. 1997).
221. Baribeau v. City of Minneapolis, 596 F.3d 465, 484 (8th Cir. 2010).
222. Pierce, 526 F.3d at 1220–21, 1247.
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Interestingly, existing law and the DOJ regulations do not appear to
support some narrow environment-frames for remedy. The DOJ
regulations for Title II, for example, indicate that a qualified individual with
a disability must have "an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the
aid, benefit, or service that is . . . equal to that afforded others."223 This
standard is not met in instances where an individual is provided access only
to her prison cell, due to structural or other barriers. Further, an argument
could be made under the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Olmstead v.
Zimrig,224 that a prisoner who is unable to leave her cell is "unjustifiably
isolated."225 In fact in Garcia, the court held that while every television
must not be closed captioned and accessible to a deaf prisoner, the
accessible televisions cannot place the plaintiff in "unjustified isolation."226
Narrow environment-frames in the remedy context may also have
constitutional implications. Briefly stated, clarification of environmentframes could help determine the limits of the ADA’s (Title II) abrogation of
state sovereign immunity. Currently, the boundaries of this abrogation are
unclear under U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence. Under the ADA, failure
to provide reasonable accommodation or other modification constitutes
discrimination.227 ADA discrimination on the basis of disability entails a
"broader swath of conduct" than the conduct prohibited by the
Constitution.228 Determining the relevant environment-frame for injunctive
relief would help establish how much conduct lies outside Constitutional
mandates and does not warrant the abrogation of state sovereign immunity.
This might be significant, as it is possible that the uncertain breadth of
injunctive relief under the ADA has limited the Court’s willingness to
interpret more broadly the overlap of the ADA with Constitutional
mandates. The Court has abrogated state sovereign immunity only in

223. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in State & Local Gov’t Servs., 28
C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(1)(ii) (2010).
224. See generally Olmstead v. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581 (1999).
225. Id. at 600–01.
226. See Garcia v. Taylor, No. 4:07-cv-474-SPM/WCS, 2009 WL 2496521 at *11
(N.D. Fla. Aug. 11, 2009) (considering "whether the proscription of discrimination may
require placement of persons with mental disabilities in community settings rather than in
institutions" (citing Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 600–01)).
227. ADA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112, 12132, 12182 (2006).
228. United States v. Georgia (Goodman), 546 U.S. 151, 160 (2006) (Stevens, J.,
concurring); see also Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 533 n.24 (2004) (quoting Kimel v.
Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 81 (2000)).
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limited contexts including courthouse229 and prison inaccessibility, the latter
rising to the level of Eighth Amendment violations.230
Thus, courts should clarify the size of environment-frames in the
remedy context for several reasons. First, clarification will promote legal
consistency. Second, narrower environment-frames undermine disability
remedies and should not be used without deliberate selection. Third, a
better understanding of the injunctive relief available under the ADA will
inform courts and litigants about the overlap between the ADA and
Constitutional protections.
The next Part addresses the impact of the ADA Amendments Act of
2008 on issues of environment-framing.231 The AAA seeks to expand
disability protections by lowering the threshold for protected class
membership.232While the AAA does not address remedy, it may indirectly
affect it. Enlarging the protected class may alter the remedies courts are
233
willing to provide under an unfunded mandate.
Thus, depending on the
implications of the AAA for class eligibility purposes, environmentframing may continue to limit disability protections at both the eligibility
and remedy stages of disability analysis after the AAA.
IV. Limitations of ADA Amendments Act of 2008
The ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (AAA) became effective January 1,
2009.234 In general terms, the Act seeks to expand the class of individuals
eligible for disability protections.235 A rule of construction within the Act
states that "disability . . . shall be construed in favor of broad coverage of
229. Lane, 541 U.S. at 533.
230. Goodman, 546 U.S. at 159.
231. See generally AAA, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008) (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2006)).
232. Id. § 2(b), 122 Stat. at 3554.
233. I use "unfunded mandate" only in a descriptive manner to indicate that, as the
ADA is currently structured, covered entities are responsible for making most
accommodation and other modification. As I argue in other work, however, disability is part
of the human condition, and responding to it should be both a governmental and a social
obligation. See generally Satz, Overcoming Fragmentation, supra note 18, at 513; Ani B.
Satz, Disability, Vulnerability, and the Limits of Antidiscrimination, 83 WASH. L. REV. 513
(2008) [hereinafter Satz, Disability]. Laws routinely impose costs to benefit the public
welfare in other contexts, including everything from building codes to vehicle emissions
inspections.
234. AAA § 8, 122 Stat. at 3559.
235. Id. § 2(b), 122 Stat. at 3554.
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individuals . . . to the maximum extent permitted [under the AAA]."236 The
AAA, like the original ADA, does not directly address environment-frames.
To date, few courts have decided cases under the AAA.237 Most cases
occurring after the AAA’s enactment involve actions that took place prior
to the effective date of the amendments.238 Courts deciding these cases
have held that the AAA does not apply retroactively239 under Landgraf v.
USI Film Products,240 or they have argued that the AAA and the original

236. Id. § 4(a), 122 Stat. at 3555–56.
237. Jenkins v. Nat’l Bd. Med. Exam’rs, No. 08-5371, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 2660, at
*1–2 (6th Cir. Feb. 11, 2009); Koenig v. Maryland, No. CCB-09-3288, 2010 WL 148706, at
*1 (D. Md. Jan. 13, 2010); Pridgen v. Dep’t of Pub. Works, No. WDQ-08-2826, 2009 WL
4726619, at *4–5 (D. Md. Dec. 1, 2009); Chiesa v. N.Y. Dep’t of Labor, 638 F. Supp. 2d
316, 321 (N.D.N.Y. 2009); Green v. Am. Univ., 647 F. Supp. 2d 21, 29 (D.D.C. 2009);
Kemppaninen v. Aransas Cnty. Det. Ctr., No. C-08-194, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52914, at
*3–4 (S.D. Tex. June 23, 2009); Collier v. Austin Peay State Univ., NO. 3:08-0400, 2009
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67363, at *21–25 (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 20, 2009); Menchaca v. Maricopa
Cmty. Coll. Dist., 595 F. Supp. 2d 1063, 1068 (D. Ariz. 2009).
238. Fikes v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 322 F. App’x 882, 883 n.1 (11th Cir. 2009); Rohr v. Salt
River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 555 F.3d 850, 853 (9th Cir. 2009);
Verhoff v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., 299 F. App’x 488, 492 (6th Cir. 2009); EEOC v. Agro
Dist., LLC, 555 F.3d 462, 469 n.8 (5th Cir. 2009); Moore v. Wal-Mart Stores East L.P., No.
7:07-CV-193(HL), 2009 WL 3109823, at *7 n.6 (M.D. Ga. Sept. 23, 2009); Franchi v. New
Hampton Sch., 656 F. Supp. 2d 252, 258–59 (D.N.H. 2009); Hammond v. Dep’t. Veteran
Affairs, No. 08-10922, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66296, at *23 (E.D. Mich. July 30, 2009);
Young v. Precision Metal Prods., Inc., 599 F. Supp. 2d 216, 223–24 (D. Conn. 2009);
Wisbey v. City of Lincoln, No. 4:09CV3093, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30819, at *22 n.4 (D.
Neb. 2009), aff’d, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 13684 (8th Cir. 2010); Pacenza v. IBM Corp., No.
04 Civ. 5831 (PGG), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29778, at *26–27 n.10 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2,
2009); Bennett v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., 315 S.W.3d 832, 842 n.8 (Ct. App. Tenn. 2009);
Brown v. Bd. of Regents Okla. Agric. & Mech. Coll. for Langston Univ., No. CIV-07-1240C, 2009 WL 467754, at *2 n.2 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 24, 2009); Menchaca v. Maricopa Cmty.
Coll. Dist., 595 F. Supp. 2d 1063, 1071 (D. Ariz. 2009); Braun v. Securitas Sec. Serv. USA,
Inc., No. 07 CV 02198(SJF)(WDW), 2009 WL 150937, at *4 n.3 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 2009).
239. Fikes v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 322 F. App’x 882, 883 n.1 (11th Cir. 2009); Milholland v.
Sumner Cnty. Bd. of Ed., 569 F.3d 562, 563 (6th Cir. 2009); EEOC v. Agro Dist., LLC, 555
F.3d 462, 469 n.8 (5th Cir. 2009); Lytes v. D.C. Water & Sewer Auth., 572 F.3d 936, 939–
42 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Young v. Precision Metal Prods., Inc., 599 F. Supp. 2d 216, 223–24 (D.
Conn. 2009); Grizzle v. Macon Cnty., No. 5:08-CV-164(CAR), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
73769, at *13 (M.D. Ga. Aug. 20, 2009); Bennett v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., 315 S.W.3d 832,
842 n.8 (Ct. App. Tenn. 2009). But see generally Jenkins v. Nat’l Bd. Med. Exam’rs, No.
08-5371, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 2660, at *1–2 (6th Cir. Feb. 11, 2009); Menchaca v.
Maricopa Cmty. Coll. Dist., 595 F. Supp. 2d 1063, 1068 (D. Ariz. 2009).
240. See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 265, 270, 273 (1994) (holding that
courts should not apply new law to previous events absent clear Congressional intent, unless
the action at stake pertains to prospective relief).
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ADA would produce the same result, avoiding the need to decide whether
the AAA could be applied.241
This Part examines the potential impact of the AAA on environmentframing. I argue that the plain language of the Act, the proposed EEOC
regulations, and the cases applying the AAA to date, indicate that it is
unlikely that the AAA will affect the environments in which courts choose
to evaluate an individual for disability. This is significant because
environment-framing may prove the easiest way to undermine the purpose
of the AAA.
A. Broadening the Protected Class Without Regard to Environment
The AAA and proposed EEOC regulations do not address
environment-frames directly. The AAA seeks to increase eligibility for the
protected class for actual disability242 by assessing an individual for
disability prior to mitigating measures,243 expanding the types of major life
activities that may qualify an individual as disabled,244 and lowering the
241. Rohr v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 555 F.3d 850, 853
(9th Cir. 2009); George v. TJX Co., Inc., No. 08 CV 275(ARR)(LB), 2009 WL 4718840, at
*9 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 9, 2009); Moore v. Wal-Mart Stores East L.P., No. 7:07-CV-193(HL),
2009 WL 3109823, at *7 n.6 (M.D. Ga. Sept. 23, 2009); Franchi v. New Hampton Sch., 656
F. Supp. 2d 252, 259 (D.N.H. 2009); Hammond v. Dep’t. Veteran Affairs, No. 08-10922,
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66296, at *23 (E.D. Mich. July 30, 2009); Brodsky v. New England
Sch. of Law, 617 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4 (D. Mass. 2009); Wisbey v. City of Lincoln, No.
4:09CV3093, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30819, at *22 n.4 (D. Neb. 2009); Pacenza v. IBM
Corp., No. 04 Civ. 5831 (PGG), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29778, at *26–27 n. 10 (S.D.N.Y.
Apr. 2, 2009); Brown v. Bd. of Regents Okla. Agric. & Mech. Coll. for Langston Univ., No.
CIV-07-1240-C, 2009 WL 467754, at *2 n.2 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 24, 2009); Braun v. Securitas
Sec. Serv. USA, Inc., No. 07 CV 02198(SJF)(WDW), 2009 WL 150937, at *4 n.3 (E.D.N.Y.
Jan. 20, 2009).
242. The Act applies the same standard to "record" of disability. AAA, Pub. L. No.
110-325, § 4(a), 122 Stat. 3553, 3555–56 (2008) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2006)).
Individuals "regarded as" disabled no longer need to demonstrate limitation of a major life
activity for real or perceived impairments. Id.
243. See id. § 2(b)(2), 122 Stat. at 3554 (stating a purpose of the amendments as: "to
reject the [standard] . . . that whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity
is to be determined with reference to the ameliorative effects of mitigating measures").
244. See id. § 4(a), 122 Stat. at 3555–56 (discussing major life activities). The AAA
provides a broad, non-exhaustive list of major life activities. Id. Functional impairments
affecting major life activities may now be episodic, or an individual may be in remission.
Id. The AAA codifies that certain activities, such as "communicating" and "major bodily
functions," are major life activities. Id. The AAA also makes clear that in order to qualify
for the protected class, an individual does not need to demonstrate that an impairment affects
more than one major life activity. Id.
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standard for demonstrating a "substantial limitation" of a major life
activity.245 The first two changes on their face do not affect environmentframing. Examining an individual prior to mitigating measures does not
speak to the environment in which her impairment is assessed. Similarly,
expanding the range of major life activities that qualify under the ADA
does not address the environment in which to assess their impact on
functioning.246 This Part will focus on the third change: loosening the
standard for what constitutes an impairment that "substantially limits" a
major life activity. I argue that this alteration affects environment-framing
only under an interpretation of the AAA that federal courts have already
failed to adopt.
1. Lowering the Threshold for "Substantially Limits"
The AAA lowers the burden articulated in Toyota v. Williams247 and
the EEOC regulations for showing a "substantial limitation" of a major
life activity.248 The potential impact of this change on environmentframing is not immediately clear, given certain ambiguities in the
statute. This Section examines these ambiguities and argues that under
each possible reading of the AAA, the Act is unlikely to influence
environment-framing. Further, recent jurisprudence construing the
statute indicates that the lower threshold for "substantially limits" is
unlikely to affect environment-frames employed by courts.
The AAA lowers the threshold for "substantially limits" by
abandoning the test articulated in Toyota that "an individual must have
an impairment that prevents or severely restricts the individual from
doing activities that are of central importance to most people’s daily
lives."249 The language is ambiguous as to whether Congress is rejecting
only that individuals must be "severely restrict[ed]" with respect to tasks
245. Id. § 2(b)(4)–(6), 122 Stat. at 3554.
246. The AAA expands the major life activities to be assessed within any environment.
Id. § 4(a), 122 Stat. at 3555–56.
247. See Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 198 (2002) ("We
therefore hold that to be substantially limited in performing manual tasks, an individual must
have an impairment that prevents or severely restricts the individual from doing activities
that are of central importance to most people’s daily lives.").
248. See AAA, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2(b)(4), 122 Stat. 3553, 3554 (2008) (codified at
42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2010)) (rejecting the Supreme Court’s Toyota standard for finding a
disability under the ADA).
249. Toyota Motor Mfg., 534 U.S. at 198; AAA § 2(b)(4), 122 Stat. at 3554.
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that are central to most people’s daily lives, or whether it is also
rejecting consideration of the tasks themselves as major life activities.250
It seems unlikely that the AAA seeks to eliminate consideration of
tasks that are of "central importance to most people’s daily lives" as
major life activities. The thrust of the Act is to expand coverage for
individuals with impairments.251 Further, the Act codifies many tasks as
major life activities that pertain to daily living, including caring for
oneself, performing manual tasks, eating, and sleeping.252 In addition,
Congressional testimony on the subject focuses entirely on the
difficulties imposed by a strict standard for "substantial limitation." To
the extent that Congressional testimony mentions the tasks themselves,
the concern is either narrow construction of "major" in "major life
activity"—i.e., focusing on a limited rather than a broad set of activities
that are "major life activities"253—or that individuals who are able to
250. The AAA states that:
The purposes of this Act are . . . (4) to reject the standards enunciated by the
Supreme Court in Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534
U.S. 184 (2002) . . . that to be substantially limited in performing a major life
activity under the ADA "an individual must have an impairment that prevents or
severely restricts the individual from doing activities that are of central
importance to most people’s daily lives."
AAA § 2(b)(4), 122 Stat. at 3554. The AAA then states that Congress intends:
(5) to convey Congressional intent that the standard created by the Supreme
Court in the case of Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams,
534 U.S. 184 (2002) for "substantially limits," and applied by lower courts in
numerous decisions, has created an inappropriately high level of limitation
necessary to obtain coverage under the ADA, to convey that it is the intent of
Congress that the primary object of attention in cases brought under the ADA
should be whether entities covered under the ADA have complied with their
obligations, and to convey that the question of whether an individual’s
impairment is a disability under the ADA should not demand extensive analysis;
and (6) to express Congress’ expectation that the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission will revise that portion of its current regulations that
defines the term "substantially limits" as "significantly restricted" to be
consistent with this Act, including the amendments made by this Act.
Id. § 2 (b)(5)–(6), 122 Stat. at 3554.
251. Id. § 4(a), 122 Stat. at 3555–56.
252. Id.
253. The ADA Restoration Act of 2007: Hearing on H.R. 3195 Before the Subcomm. on
Constitution, Civil Rights & Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong.
71 (2007) [hereinafter ADA Hearing 2007] (statement of Ms. Chai R. Feldblum, Professor,
Georgetown University Law Center and current Commissioner of the EEOC) ("The
Supreme Court, in Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, ruled that the
words ‘substantially limits’ and ‘major life activities’ in the definition disability ‘need to be
interpreted strictly to create a demanding standard for qualifying as disabled.’"). "This was
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fulfill certain daily tasks should not automatically be disqualified as
disabled in performing other tasks.254
Regardless of whether the AAA is interpreted to mean a rejection of a
strict standard for "substantially limits" alone, or a rejection of that standard
combined with a rejection of certain daily tasks as major life activities, the
Act will likely not affect environment-framing under the disability
threshold test. If Congress intended only to alter the interpretation of
"substantially limits" as "preventing or severely restricting" a major life
activity,255 the AAA does not relate to environment-framing but rather to
the degree to which impairment impacts a major life activity. Under the
contrary to the various statements in the legislative history indicating an assumption that the
definition of disability would be interpreted broadly." Id. "As a result of this ruling, people
alleging discrimination must now show that their impairments prevent or severely restrict
them from doing activities that are of central importance to most people’s daily lives." Id.;
The ADA Restoration Act of 2007: Hearing on H.R. 3195 Before the H. Comm. on Educ. &
Labor, 110th Cong. 64 (2008) [hereinafter ADA Hearing 2008] (statement of Mr. Andrew J.
Imparato, President and Chief Executive officer of the American Association of People with
Disabilities) ("It was the Toyota v. Williams decision that really severely restricted what
constitutes a substantial limitation and a major life activity. The court said that they had to
be activities that were of central importance to most people’s daily lives."); ADA Hearing
2007, supra, at 38 (statement of Mr. Michael C. Collins, Executive Director of the National
Council on Disability) ("The phrase ‘of central importance to most people’s daily lives’ has
led to extensive questioning by courts about each individual’s ability to brush his or her
teeth, bathe, dress, stand, sit, lift, eat, sleep and interact with others."). "It has led to contrary
rulings by federal courts about whether activities such as communicating, driving,
gardening, crawling, jumping, learning, shopping in the mall, performing house work, and
even working and living are ‘major life activities.’" Id.
254. See, e.g., ADA Hearing 2008, supra note 253, at 12 (statement of Mr. Andrew J.
Imparato, President and Chief Executive Officer of the American Association of People with
Disabilities) ("Citing the Williams case, the 11th Circuit . . . use[d] evidence about Mr.
Littleton’s ability to drive and be interviewed for a job against him on the issue of
disability . . . . Do we want to send . . . the message that you should be careful not to achieve
your full potential, be careful not to live as independently as possible, or you may lose your
federal civil rights protections[?]").
While performing daily living tasks may be indicia of functioning relevant to a major
life activity, an ability to complete such tasks does not preclude a substantial limitation of a
major life activity. The AAA in fact clarifies that an individual needs to demonstrate
limitation of only one major life activity. See AAA, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 4(a), 122 Stat.
3553, 3555–56 (2008) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2006)) ("An impairment that
substantially limits one major life activity need not limit other major life activities in order to
be considered a disability.").
255. See ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 2(a)(8) (2006) (finding the "severely restricts" language of
Toyota inconsistent with Congressional intent); supra notes 247–49 (discussing Toyota); see
also Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197 (2002) ("That
[‘substantially limits’ and ‘major’ in ‘major life activities’] need to be interpreted strictly to
create a demanding standard for qualifying as disabled is confirmed by the first section of
the ADA.").
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AAA, plaintiffs will now face a less burdensome threshold for showing a
substantial limitation of a major life activity, whatever the environment
chosen for assessment. This is the view taken by the Sixth Circuit in the
first Court of Appeals decision applying the AAA: "Congress overturned
the definition of ‘substantially limits’ put forward in Toyota . . . . The
district court [wrongfully] concluded that Jenkins would only qualify for
protection under the ADA if his disability ‘precluded’ him from performing
reading tasks of that were ‘central to most people’s daily lives.’"256
The view that the AAA lessens the "substantial limitation" threshold
without regard to environment is also supported by the proposed EEOC
regulations. Previously, the regulations considered the "condition, manner,
or duration" of a major life activity in assessing its severity.257 "Condition"
could have been interpreted by courts to pertain to environment. While
courts did not interpret "condition" in this manner, the AAA provided an
opportunity for Congress (and subsequently the EEOC) to do so. Instead,
the EEOC struck the language from the regulations so as "not to be
misconstrued to require the ‘level of limitation, and the intensity of focus,’
applied [to "substantially limits"]."258
If Congress is also rejecting consideration of major life activities that
are of "central importance to most people’s daily lives," it is still unlikely
that the AAA speaks to environment-framing. Under this view, courts
would no longer be concerned with functioning pertaining to a particular set
of daily activities. Congress clearly rejected the holding in Toyota that
major life activities must be activities of "central importance" to daily
living.259 This fails, however, to address the broader role of daily activities
in disability analysis. Either the activities are not required but may be
considered, or Congress intended to exclude a certain set of daily activities

256. Jenkins v. Nat’l Bd. Med. Exam’rs, No. 08-5371, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 2660, at
*2 (6th Cir. Feb. 11, 2009) (emphasis added).
257. See Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the ADA, 29
C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1) (2010) ("The term substantially limits means . . . [s]ignificantly
restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which an individual can perform a
particular major life activity."). This language does not appear in the DOJ regulations
interpreting Titles II and III.
258. Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the ADA, 74 Fed.
Reg. 48444, 48446 (proposed Sept. 23, 2009) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1630).
259. See AAA § 2(b)(4), 122 Stat. at 3554 ("[This Act’s purpose is] to reject the
[Supreme Court’s standard] . . . that to be substantially limited in performing a major life
activity . . . ‘an individual must have an impairment that prevents or severely restricts the
individual from doing activities that are of central importance to most people’s daily
lives.’").
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from disability analysis altogether. Under either reading, the activities
could be assessed in any environment. Daily living tasks like teeth
brushing, showering, dressing, etc., need not take place in the home
environment.
The only interpretation of the AAA that would speak directly to
environment-framing would be that the rejection of the Toyota standard
means that major life activities must not be measured in every environment
in which they occur—e.g., a broad environment that includes both a
person’s home and work environment. This interpretation seems possible
under the proposed EEOC regulations: "An individual whose impairment
substantially limits a major life activity need not also demonstrate a
limitation in the ability to perform activities of central importance to daily
life."260 One of the examples states, "[s]omeone with a 20-pound lifting
restriction that is not of short-term duration is substantially limited in
lifting, and need not also show that he is unable to perform activities of
daily living that require lifting in order to be considered substantially
limited in lifting."261 Under this construction of the AAA, courts could
asses an individual with respect to the major life activity of "lifting" in a
narrow environment, i.e., at work, rather than in an environment that
includes both home and work.
These regulations arguably extend beyond the AAA, however, which
seeks to expand the definition of disability, not contract the environment in
which people are assessed for disability.262 Further, cases decided after the
AAA indicate that a broad environment-frame will remain for assessing
major life activities. In Rohr v. Salt River Project,263 the Ninth Circuit
260. Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the ADA, 74 Fed.
Reg. at 48440.
261. Id. (Ex. 1). A second example is also provided: "Someone with monocular vision
whose depth perception or field of vision would be substantially limited . . . need not also
show that he is unable to perform activities of central importance to daily life that require
seeing in order to be substantially limited in seeing." Id. (Ex. 2). This narrow interpretation
of environment is further illustrated in the proposed regulations discussing the major life
activity of "working." Id. at 48442. An individual’s impairment may substantially limit her
in the major life activity of "working," even if the same impairment does not limit her
activities as compared to most people outside the workplace. Id.
262. Other scholars note that the proposed EEOC regulations extend beyond the statute.
Laura Rothstein, Address at the SEALS Annual Meeting: Higher Education and the
Americans with Disabilities Act—A Review and Preview (July 31, 2010) (unpublished
lecture); see also Laura Rothstein, Strategic Advocacy in Fulfilling the Goals of Disability
Policy: Is the Only Question How Full the Glass Is?, 13 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 403, 403–12
(2008) (presenting similar arguments with respect to proposals to amend the ADA).
263. See Rohr v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 555 F.3d 850,
864 (9th Cir. 2009) (discussing but not applying AAA, which became law while the case
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indicated in dicta that: "The Supreme Court has made clear that the
substantial limitation inquiry is not limited to the effects of the impairment
in the workplace . . . . Rather, the proper inquiry is whether the physical
impairment substantially limits the claimed major life activity in daily
life."264 The court goes on to address the AAA’s effect on the Toyota test in
terms of lowering the threshold for what constitutes a "substantial"
limitation, with no discussion of the Act altering the "daily life," or broad
environment component.265 The "daily lives" language is also embraced by
other courts that discuss (but do not apply) the AAA.266 Some cases
decided after the AAA assume but do not discuss a broad environmentframe that would be consistent with the "daily lives" component of the
Toyota test.267
In addition, while the narrow environment-frames for major life
activities proposed by the EEOC may solve the problem with current
(broad) environment-framing limiting eligibility for the protected class,
they perpetuate a view of disability that is fragmented and artificial.
Fragmentation occurs because the actual experience of living with a
disability differs from the legally recognized one. An individual’s
impairment is treated as if it exists only within certain contexts, such as the
workplace or particular places of public accommodation. In reality,
however, an impairment may impact an individual’s ability to function in
other situations, and those limitations may in turn impact her ability to
maintain employment or to participate within the civic or social realms.
For example, an individual’s ability to perform manual tasks in a timely
manner at home, such as meal preparation, laundry, and dependent care,
may affect whether she is able to work.268 Similarly, an individual who
was pending).
264. Id. at 858 n.5 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
265. Id. at 861.
266. See Grizzle v. Macon Cnty., Ga., No. 5:08-CV-164, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
73769, at *19 (M.D. Ga. Aug. 20, 2009) ("[M]ajor life activities are broadly defined as those
that are of central importance to daily life and ‘that the average person in the general
population can perform with little or no difficulty.’").
267. See Moen v. Genesee Cnty. Friend of the Ct., No. 2:08-cv-12824, 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 57177, at *16 (E.D. Mich. July 6, 2009) (referring to an "active lifestyle" with
respect to a question about substantial limitation in the major life activity of walking);
Menchaca v. Maricopa Cmty. Coll. Dist, 2595 F. Supp. 2d 1063, 1069 (D. Ariz. 2009)
(describing various major life activities including "interacting with others" as affecting
personal and work relationships); Franchi v. New Hampton Sch., 656 F. Supp. 2d 252, 255
(D.N.H. 2009) (discussing an eating disorder as affecting life inside and outside boarding
school).
268. Sam Bagenstos has authored an important body of work discussing the need for
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does not have reliable transportation to otherwise physically accessible
buildings may not have access to the services or opportunities available
within those facilities. As I argue in Part V, it is important to adopt a
holistic view of disability to determine eligibility and remedy; otherwise,
protections will be sporadic. Thus, I will argue that in the eligibility
context the problem is not with a broad environment-frame per se, but with
the manner in which courts currently interpret that frame. Further, as
discussed below, for some major life activities, such as "working," an
environment-frame that is too narrow may further confound disability
eligibility analysis by failing to provide guidance to courts about whom to
exclude from the protected class.
2. "Substantially Limits" and the Major Life Activity of "Working"
Not only does the AAA fail to clarify the relevant environment for
assessing the major life activity of "working," the proposed EEOC
regulations supporting the Act arguably exacerbate existing problems of
environment-framing. As discussed in Part II.B, the major life activity of
"working" is the only area where the EEOC and courts interpreting the
regulations previously sought to define the relevant environment for
assessing individuals’ functional impairments. When assessing whether an
individual was "substantially limited," courts considered "the geographical
area to which the individual has reasonable access . . . and the number and
types of jobs utilizing similar training, knowledge, skills, or abilities within
that geographical area from which the individual is also disqualified
because of the impairment."269 While the AAA does not alter this
approach,270 the EEOC has interpreted the Act’s general mandate to
material supports to address disability discrimination. SAMUEL R. BAGENSTOS, LAW AND THE
CONTRADICTIONS OF THE DISABILITY RIGHTS MOVEMENT chs. 7–8 (2009); Samuel R.
Bagenstos, The Future of Disability Law, 114 YALE L.J. 1, 59–70 (2004) [hereinafter
Bagenstos, Future]. Bagenstos discusses what he terms the "access/content" distinction in
disability law, namely, individuals with disabilities have access to the same benefits as
individuals who are not disabled, though the content of the benefits is not altered to meet the
needs of individuals with disabilities. Bagenstos, Future, supra, at 35. In an insightful
article, Michael Waterstone explores the benefits of material supports provided to disabled
veterans under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act.
Michael E. Waterstone, Returning Veterans and Disability Law, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1081, 1109–10 (2010).
269. Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the ADA, 29
C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii)(B)–(C) (2010).
270. See AAA, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 4(a), 122 Stat. 3553, 3555–56 (2008) (codified
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construe the definition of disability "broad[ly] . . . to the maximum extent
permitted"271 as requiring the elimination of the geographic (environment)
requirement.272
Under the proposed EEOC regulations, individuals need not show
substantial limitation in a "class of jobs" or a "broad range of jobs in
various classes" within a certain region, but only that they are limited in a
"type of work" based on the ability of an individual to perform a job as
compared to most people with similar skills and training.273 The underlying
though unstated assumption is that the broad environment embraced by
courts undermined eligibility for protected class membership. One way
around this problem would be to interpret the availability of other jobs in
the geographic region as probative, rather than dispositive, of functionality.
The EEOC instead eliminated the geographic requirement. The proposed
regulations also imply that a particular place of employment is not the
legally-relevant environment.274 As a result, the regulations provide no
guidance to courts about the environment in which to assess "type of work."
In fact one could argue that if the environment is not a particular workplace
or a group of workplaces in the region, no environment exists in which to
assess the major life activity of "working."
Thus, the AAA is unlikely to affect environment-framing, unless
courts defer to the EEOC regulations with respect to workplace analysis
(and exclude consideration of the effect of major life activities at home) or
the major life activity of "working" specifically (and eliminate the
geographic requirement). Courts have already indicated an unwillingness

at 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2006)) ("The term ‘substantially limits’ shall be interpreted
consistently with the findings and purposes of the ADA Amendments Act of 2008.").

271. Id.
272. See Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the ADA, 74
Fed. Reg. 48431, 48448 (proposed Sept. 23, 2009) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1630)
("[T]he specific factors in the prior regulation . . . have been eliminated, including the
geographical area to which the individual has reasonable access . . . or abilities within that
geographical area from which the individual is also disqualified because of the
impairment.").
273. See id. at 48447 ("The terms ‘class of jobs’ and ‘broad range of jobs in various
classes’ . . . have been eliminated, and replaced with ‘type of work’ . . . [in] which the
individual is substantially limited when compared to most people having similar training,
skills, and abilities . . . .").
274. See id. ("A type of work includes the job the individual has been performing or for
which he is applying, and jobs that have qualifications or job-related requirements which the
individual would be substantially limited in performing as a result of the impairment."
(emphasis added)).
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to adopt the former view.275 Adopting the latter position would confuse
judicial analysis by effectively removing all possible environment-frames
from consideration for the major life activity of "working." As the next
Subpart discusses, Congress’s failure to address environment-framing
directly in the AAA could undermine the Act’s purpose to expand disability
protections. Courts may continue to manipulate environment-frames to
reach desired judicial outcomes with respect to disability eligibility and
remedy.
B. The Environment-Frame Loophole and the Potential to
Undermine the AAA
The AAA’s failure to address environment-frames may prove
significant, as courts struggle to implement the new, broader definition of
disability under the auspices of unfunded mandates for reasonable
accommodation and other modification.276 In this Subpart, I briefly discuss
three possible judicial responses to this problem—constricting remedy,
strictly interpreting "essential functions,"277 and manipulating the
environment-frame. While all three would allow an end-run around the
AAA, I argue that the environment-frame limitation may be the most
concerning.
One possibility for courts to control expenditures for disability
accommodation or other modification is to construe even more narrowly
remedies under Titles I–III.278 Most notably, the "undue hardship"279
defense could play a significant role in remedy reduction. A disabled
individual does not suffer illegal discrimination when an employer or other
entity fails to make a modification that imposes an "undue hardship."280
Under Title I, an accommodation that causes "undue hardship" is one that
"requir[es] significant difficulty or expense" measured relative to other
employees and the financial resources of relevant facilities.281 "Undue
hardship" is an amorphous concept, with the EEOC regulations simply
275. Supra Part IV.A.2.
276. See supra note 233 (discussing the use of "unfunded mandate").
277. ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2006).
278. Remedy provisions include: Id. § 12117(a) (Title I); § 12133 (Title II); § 12188(a)
(Title III). The AAA does not alter the ADA with respect to remedies.
279. Id. § 12111(10)(A)–(B).

280. Id.
281. Id.
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restating the scant statutory requirements,282 and the EEOC Interpretive
Guidance offering only that an accommodation need not be "unduly
costly."283 This financial-based understanding of "undue hardship" is
imported into Titles II and III with respect to injunctive relief. Under Title
II, public services need not be altered if they impose an "undue hardship" or
require a "fundamental alteration" of a "service, program, or activity."284
Similarly, under Title III, alterations to existing structures must be "readily
achievable"285 and not require "much difficulty or expense."286 These
hardship-related defenses could, under current law, be construed broadly to
preclude remedies for new members of the protected class. One could
consider such injunctive relief and undue hardship as "two sides of the
same coin": Expansion of what constitutes undue hardship will limit
reasonable accommodation or other modification and vice versa.287
Another option for reducing expenditures is to restrict the protected
class by focusing on the "qualified individual" component of who is a
"qualified individual with a disability."288 After an individual demonstrates
a statutorily protected disability, she must identify an accommodation or
other modification to promote access.289 To be a "qualified individual"
under Title I, one must be capable of performing the essential functions of
her job "with or without reasonable accommodation."290 Under Titles II
and III, an individual must be able to access services and buildings,
respectively, once reasonable modification is made.291 Restricting who is
considered a "qualified individual" may be done in a number of ways.
282. See Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the ADA, 29
C.F.R. § 1630.2(p) (2010) ("Undue hardship—(1) In general. Undue hardship means, with
respect to the provision of an accommodation, significant difficulty or expense incurred by a
covered entity.").
283. Id. § 1630 app.
284. ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(ii)–(iii) (2006).
285. Id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv).
286. See id. § 12181(9) ("The term ‘readily achievable’ means easily accomplishable
and able to be carried out without much difficulty or expense."). The factors that a court
considers include "the nature and cost of the action . . . the overall financial resources of the
facility . . . the overall financial resources of the covered entity . . . and the [nature] of [the]
operation . . . ." Id.
287. See, e.g., Mark C. Weber, Unreasonable Accommodation and Due Hardship, 62
FLA. L. REV. 1119, 1148 (2010) ("The legislative sources make clear that reasonable
accommodation and undue hardship are a single concept.").
288. ADA § 12111(8).
289. Id. §§ 12113(a), 12131, 12182(b)(2)(v).
290. Id. § 12111(8).
291. Id. §§ 12131, 12182(b)(2)(v).
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Under Title I, courts could construe the "essential functions"292 requirement
more narrowly. Courts could give greater deference to informal or evolving
employer descriptions about what are the essential functions of a particular
job. Employers could construct job descriptions in a manner that precludes
an individual with a disability from performing necessary tasks effectively,
with or without a reasonable accommodation. Under all three titles, courts
could lower the standard for a defendant to demonstrate lack of an effective
reasonable modification for a disability to the point where no modification
would be viewed as improving access. A defendant who fails to make an
alteration when it would not improve employment eligibility293 or access to
services294 or public spaces is acting legally.295
Alternatively, courts may restrict the protected class by continuing to
use broad environment-frames and subjecting them to traditional analysis.
Environment-framing is perhaps the most troubling hurdle to the AAA for
several reasons.
First, unlike the "undue hardship,"296 "qualified
297
individual," and "essential functions" requirements,298 no judicial test
exists for determining the relevant environment in which to assess the
impact of an individual’s impairment. The only regulatory guidance is for
the major life activity of "working," and the proposed EEOC regulations
remove it.299 Second, historically courts have, without explanation or
analysis, assumed environments that disfavor disability protections.300
Third, AAA jurisprudence indicates environment-framing under the ADA
will not change.301 As a result, the success of the AAA may rest in part on
the whim of courts. To close this loophole, courts must actively address
and define the relevant environment-frames for disability eligibility and
remedy under the ADA. In the following Part, I propose a method for
defining and interpreting these frames.

292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.

Id. § 12111(8).
Id. § 12113(a).
Id. § 12131.
Id. § 12182(b)(2)(v).
Id. § 12111(10)(A)–(B).
Id. §§ 12113(a), 12131, 12182(b)(2)(v).
Id. § 12111(8).
Supra Part IV.A.2.
Supra Parts II–III.
Supra Part IV.A.1.
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V. Overcoming Fragmentation
I propose a two-part solution to transcend the problems caused by
environment-framing. The problems include legal inconsistency in the
construction of environments in which individuals’ impairments are
assessed; the undermining of disability claims; and fragmentation, the
disjunction between the human experience of disability and the legally
recognized one. First, courts should adopt broad frames for both the
eligibility and remedy stages of disability analysis. Courts should assess
individuals in a broad environment that includes workplace, home, and
other daily environments. Second, courts should interpret an individual’s
ability to function in a holistic manner by considering her ability to function
across various civic and social environments. This approach will expose
barriers to accessibility and allow more meaningful accommodation or
other modification. The ability to function in some portion of a broad
environment must not undermine disability status, however, as it does
currently in ADA jurisprudence.302
Ironically, Social Security disability benefits cases, which are
maligned for the restrictive definition of disability they impose, provide
insight into a mechanism for defining and assessing environment-frames for
disability status.303 Eligibility for Social Security disability benefits is
determined according to a holistic view of an individual’s ability to
function across all relevant environments.304 The aggregate effect of
impairments is viewed across these environments.305 Social Security cases
emphasize the importance of adopting a broad environment-frame to gain a
complete picture of an individual’s ability to function in society. To view
the environment-frame in any other way, as the ADA eligibility and remedy
302. Supra Part II.
303. The Social Security Act employs a more restrictive definition of disability than the
ADA, yet individuals may be viewed as disabled under the Social Security Act and not the
ADA. See Grizzle v. Macon Cnty., Ga., No. 5:08-CV-164, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73769,
at *27 (M.D. Ga. Aug. 20, 2009) (holding that an individual with bi-polar disorder receiving
Social Security benefits for impairments that included that disorder did not qualify as
disabled under the ADA). In some jurisdictions, receipt of Social Security benefits is
evidence of disability for purposes of the ADA, though not dispositive. Moore v. Wal-Mart
Stores E., L.P., No. 7:07-CV-193 (HL), 2009 WL 3109823, at *8 (M.D. Ga. Sept. 23, 2009).
In Moore, the Social Security Administration recognized the claimant as disabled, even
employing an extremely broad view of class of jobs including the "national economy,"
"because she is unable to sustain an eight hour work day on a regular and continuing basis."
Id. at *5.
304. Infra Part V.A.2.
305. Infra Part V.A.
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cases indicate, would distort the human experience of disability by treating
disability as if it arises in discrete contexts.306 In addition, the Social
Security cases highlight a method of assessing a broad frame that does not
punish an individual for functioning, perhaps out of desperation or other
necessity, in some portion of her daily environment.
It is important to emphasize that I am concerned with the possibilities
of the mechanism for defining and assessing environment-frames offered
by the Social Security Act and supporting regulations and cases. I do not
intend to overstate the positive results for claimants with respect to this
approach. The decisions of the Social Security Administration and courts
do not always honor the spirit of a holistic, aggregative assessment.
Lawyers who litigate Social Security cases recount times when claimants
who admitted they could lift a gallon milk jug (8.7 pounds) were deemed
ineligible for benefits because they were viewed as being able to lift more
than five pounds repetitively at work.307 My intention is simply to
emphasize the promise of a method that considers functionality more
completely for avoiding fragmentation and promoting disability protections.
A. Social Security Litigation and the "Holistic, Aggregate Look"
An individual is assessed holistically for disability Social Security
program eligibility in several ways.308 First, an individual’s functioning is
306. See Satz, Disability, supra note 233, at 541–50 (introducing my concept of macrolevel fragmentation); Satz, Overcoming Fragmentation, supra note 18 (developing my
theory of fragmentation and distinguishing between macro- and micro-level fragmentation).
307. I am grateful to Mark Weber for reminding me of this point.
308. Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) is paid to individuals with previous
sufficient payroll contributions. Soc. Sec. Admin., 2010 Red Book, at 13 (2010), available
at http://www.socialsecurity.gov/redbook/eng/2010%20Red%20Bookpdf.pdf [hereinafter
Red Book] (noting that to be qualified, individuals must "be ‘insured’ due to contributions
made to FICA based on" payroll earnings). Monthly support increases with previous
earnings, though the average estimate for 2009 was $1,064 to each individual per month.
Soc. Sec. Admin, Fact Sheet Social Security: 2009 Social Security Changes (2008),
available
at
http://www.socialsecurity.gov/pressoffice/factsheets/colafacts2009.pdf.
Recipients of SSDI are eligible for Medicare. Red Book, supra, at 13. Supplemental
Security Income (SSI) is a means-tested program paying $674 per month for an individual in
2010. Id. Individuals receiving SSI are eligible for Medicaid. Id. Individuals with
disabilities may receive both SSDI and SSI benefits, though SSDI benefits are included in
SSI eligibility calculations. Id. Both SSDI and SSI benefits are predicated on an inability to
work. Id. at 14. Under the Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Improvement Act of 1999,
individuals who return to work may be able to maintain limited health coverage and cash
payments. Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Improvement Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106170, 113 Stat. 1860 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320b-19 (2006)). Medicare beneficiaries may
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assessed overall, rather than with respect to individual impairments.
Second, an individual’s level of impairment is determined by considering
evidence of functioning at work and in other environments. Third, the
Social Security Administration employs the "treating-physician rule,"
which requires an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) to give greater
deference to the opinions of treating physicians than to the opinions of nontreating physicians.309 Treating physicians are considered "likely to be the
medical professionals most able to provide a detailed, longitudinal picture
of [the claimant’s] medical impairment(s)."310 This Part will focus on the
first two aspects of Social Security assessment and the broad environmentframes they entail. The "treating-physician rule" is the product of adopting
such frames and does not warrant further consideration here.
1. Assessing Impairments in the Aggregate
The Social Security Administration uses a five-step sequential
evaluation process to determine whether an individual is disabled.311 The
keep their insurance for eight and a half years. Id. § 202. Medicaid coverage may be
extended or available for purchase. Id. § 201. Generally speaking, cash payments are
phased out, given sufficient wages. Red Book, supra, at 30.
309. See Determining Disability & Blindness, 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d)(2) (2010)
("Generally, we give more weight to opinions from [claimant’s] treating sources . . . ."); see
also Blakley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399, 406 (6th Cir. 2009) ("[T]he treating
physician rule, requires the ALJ to generally give greater deference to the opinions of
treating physicians than to the opinions of non-treating physicians . . . .").
310. Blakley, 581 F.3d at 406 (citing Wilson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541, 544
(6th Cir. 2004) (quoting Determining Disability & Blindness, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2)
(2004))).
311. Determining Disability & Blindness, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i)–(v) (2010).
Federal appeals courts review whether the ALJ made findings supported by substantial
evidence and employed proper legal standards in reaching a conclusion. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g) (2006) ("Any individual, after any final decision of the Commissioner of Social
Security made after a hearing to which he was a party . . . may obtain a review of such
decision by a civil action . . . ."); Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 2001)
("We will uphold the ALJ’s decision if it is free of legal error and supported by substantial
evidence."); Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 227 (3d Cir. 1999) ("The role of this Court is
identical to that of the District Court, namely to determine whether there is substantial
evidence to support the Commissioner’s decision."); Andrade v. Sec’y of Health & Human
Servs., 985 F.2d 1045, 1047 (10th Cir. 1993) ("Our review of the Secretary’s decision is
limited to whether his findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record and
whether he applied the correct legal standards." (citations omitted)); Brainard v. Sec’y of
Health & Human Servs., 889 F.2d 679, 681 (6th Cir. 1989) ("Judicial review of the
Secretary’s decision is limited to determining whether the Secretary’s findings are supported
by substantial evidence and whether the Secretary employed the proper legal standards in
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Social Security Administration assesses impairments in the aggregate to
provide a more holistic view of a person’s functioning across
environments.312 An ALJ first determines: (1) whether the claimant is
engaged in substantial gainful employment activity,313 (2) has a medically
severe impairment or combination of impairments that significantly limits
her ability to perform basic work activities,314 and (3) has an impairment
that is the same as, or equivalent to, a listed impairment.315 The ALJ
assesses "severe impairment" by considering an individual’s overall ability
to function or "the combined effect of all of the individual’s impairments
without regard to whether any such impairment, if considered separately,
would be of such severity."316 If these three criteria are met, the individual
is considered disabled.
When the impairment at stake is not a listed one, an individual must
prove (4) an inability to perform past relevant work.317 If such impairment
is established, the burden shifts to the Agency to establish that the claimant
retains sufficient (5) residual functional capacity to permit her to engage in
other substantial gainful employment.318 Residual functional capacity
measures a claimant’s highest sustainable level of functioning in a work
setting.319
When determining disability eligibility, the Social Security
Administration and courts broadly assess an individual’s functioning within
relevant environments. The Administration considers the extent to which
one’s capability to work is diminished because of environmental
reaching her conclusion."); Rodriguez v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 647 F.2d 218,
222 (1st Cir. 1981) ("The Social Security Act specifically mandates that ‘[t]he findings of
the Secretary as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive.’"
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1970))).
312. Determining Disability & Blindness, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i)–(v) (2010).
313. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i).
314. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). The "ability to do basic work activities" is defined as "the
abilities and aptitudes necessary to do most jobs." Id. § 404.1521(b).
315. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii).
316. Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(B) (2006); see also Webb v. Barnhart,
433 F.3d 683, 688 (9th Cir. 2005) (discussing this method of assessment).
317. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv).
318. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v).
319. See id. § 404.1545 ("Your residual functional capacity is the most you can still do
despite your limitations."). RFC is also measured at step (4), though if an individual is
unable to perform past relevant work her claim will proceed to step (5). See id.
§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii) ("At the fourth step, we consider our assessment of your residual
functional capacity and your past relevant work. If you can still do your past relevant work,
we will find that you are not disabled.").
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limitations.320 Both a claimant’s "subjective symptoms" and "objective
321
medical evidence" are considered.
Courts have almost uniformly agreed
that the ability to work within the Social Security context means "the ability
to perform the requisite physical acts day in and day out, in the sometimes
competitive and stressful conditions in which real people work in the real
world."322 Being able to work requires physical labor as well as
"substantial capacity, steady attendance, and psychological stability."323
In assessing an individual’s residual functional capacity, the Agency or
reviewing courts consider the aggregate effect of all impairments by
examining the claimant in different environments and over an extended
period of time.324 Factors include: (1) daily activities; (2) location,
duration, frequency, and intensity of pain and other symptoms, (3) factors
that precipitate or aggravate symptoms, (4) effects of medication, (5) effects
of treatments other than medication, and (6) any other factors concerning an
individual’s functional limitations and restrictions.325 Biological as well as
socially-constructed impairments may be considered.326 Exertion levels at
work may also be relevant.327
The regulations regarding mental functional capacity are even more
specific in noting the need to obtain an aggregate view of an individual’s
disability. Federal regulations state that the "assessment of [mental]
functional limitation . . . requires us to consider . . . all relevant evidence to
obtain a longitudinal picture of [a claimant’s] overall degree of functional
limitation."328 The regulations further provide that the degree of functional
limitation is based on "the extent to which . . . impairment(s) interfere[]
320. Wingo v. Bowen, 852 F.2d 827, 830 (5th Cir. 1988).
321. Id.
322. McCoy v. Schweiker, 683 F.2d 1138, 1147 (8th Cir. 1982), abrogated on other
grounds by Forney v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 266 (1998).
323. Silk v. Astrue, 509 F. Supp. 2d 779, 785 (S.D. Iowa 2007) (citing Rhines v. Harris,
634 F.3d 1076, 1079 (8th Cir. 1980)).
324. See Gentle v. Barnhart, 430 F.3d 865, 868 (7th Cir. 2005) (reversing the judgment
because "the administrative law judge failed to consider [claimant’s] disabilities in
combination, as the cases require"); see also Gaylor v. Astrue, 292 F. App’x 506, 515–516
(7th Cir. 2008) (holding that "the ALJ was required to consider [claimant’s] back problems
and mental impairments together and evaluate their aggregate effect on his ability to work");
Wingo, 852 F.2d at 830 ("[T]he ALJ’s mechanical application of the guidelines failed to
consider the aggregate impact of [plaintiff’s] ailments.").
325. Glomski v. Massanari, 172 F. Supp. 2d 1079, 1083–84 (E.D. Wis. 2001).
326. Kelly v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 871 F. Supp. 586, 592 (W.D.N.Y.
1994).
327. SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184 (July 2, 1996).
328. Determining Disability & Blindness, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(c)(1) (2010).
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with [a claimant’s] ability to function independently, appropriately,
effectively, and on a sustained basis."329 This determination is made based
on such factors as overall functional performance, episodic limitations, the
amount of supervision or assistance required, and the settings in which the
claimant is able to function.330 The four broad areas in which mental
functional limitations are measured are: (1) activities of daily living;
(2) social functioning; (3) concentration, persistence, and pace; and
(4) episodes of decompensation (i.e., temporary increases in symptoms
followed by loss of functioning).331
2. Considering Multiple Environments
The focus on "daily activities" with respect to residual functional
capacity and the "longitudinal look" for mental disabilities requires that the
Social Security Administration assess individuals at work as well as in
other environments to determine whether they are employable.332 An ALJ’s
decision may in fact be overturned, if a claimant’s functionality is only
assessed in her work environment.333 Unlike ADA jurisprudence, however,
courts assessing Social Security claims have cautioned against ALJs
"giving undue evidentiary weight to a claimant’s ability to carry out
activities incident to day-to-day living when evaluating [that individual’s]
ability to perform full-time work."334 Judges considering Social Security
claims must consider the frequency and independence of activities
performed by the claimant, and her ability to sustain these activities over a
period of time.335 As the Ninth Circuit has held, "daily activities may
discredit a claimant only where they constitute a ‘substantial part’ of her
day and are transferable to a work setting, and the mere performance of
329.
330.
331.
332.

Id. § 404.1520a(c)(2).
Id.
Id. § 404.1520a(c)(3).
See id. § 404.1520a(c)(3)–(4) (noting that the assessment of functional limitation

is a "complex and highly individualized process," which includes evaluation of "the settings
in which [claimant is] able to function").
333. See, e.g., Carpenter v. Astrue, 537 F.3d 1264, 1269 (10th Cir. 2008) (holding that
the failure of the ALJ to consider claimant’s assertion that she could not drive, read, do
math, cook, or prepare meals resulted in an evaluation that did not consider "all relevant
evidence to obtain a longitudinal picture of the [claimant’s overall] degree of functional
limitation" (citations omitted)).
334. Reed v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 917, 923 (8th Cir. 2005).

335. Id.
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certain daily activities does not in any way detract from her credibility as to
her overall disability."336
Courts have held in a number of contexts that the ability of a claimant
to function in some part of a broad environment does not render her
ineligible for Social Security disability benefits.337 Claimants who are able
to function at home,338 at medical facilities,339 at schools,340 or in the
broader social realm341 may be viewed as disabled for Social Security
purposes. Numerous courts have recognized undertaking tasks at home
does not necessarily transfer to a work environment.342 Time and other
336. Woolsey-Crandall v. Astrue, 258 F. App’x 147, 148–49 (9th Cir. 2007).
337. See Hennen v. Astrue, 257 F. App’x 21, 22 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding that the ALJ
failed to establish a relationship between claimant’s activity at a local bar and his alleged
disabilities).
338. See Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1284 n.7 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting that the ALJ
may "reject a claimant’s symptom testimony if the claimant is able to spend a substantial
part of her day performing household chores," but further noting that this line of reasoning
has its limits); see also Ford v. Astrue, 518 F.3d 979, 983 (8th Cir. 2008) (finding that
claimant’s activities of "washing a few dishes, ironing one or two pieces of clothing, making
three or four meals each week, and reading" were not inconsistent with her disability claim);
Gaylor v. Astrue, 292 F. App’x 506, 513 (7th Cir. 2008) ("[I]t is a deficient analysis to
assume that a claimant’s ability to care for personal needs and the needs of his or her
children is synonymous with an ability to be gainfully employed."); Murphy v. Sec’y of
Health & Human Servs., 872 F. Supp. 1153, 1159 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) ("The fact that plaintiff
could read and watch television and movies also does not necessarily support the ALJ’s
conclusion that plaintiff was capable of sedentary work.").
339. See Genier v. Astrue, 298 F. App’x 105, 106, 108 (2d Cir. 2008) (vacating the
ALJ’s finding that claimant’s functional assessment by a "consultative doctor" revealed that
she was only "moderately limited"); Cox v. Barnhart, 345 F.3d 606, 610 (8th Cir. 2003)
(noting that a single medical evaluation does "not constitute substantial evidence on which
the ALJ can permissibly base his decision"); Vertigan v. Halter, 260 F.3d 1044, 1050 (9th
Cir. 2001) (finding that claimant’s ability to participate in physical therapy and exercise did
not support a finding that she could perform past relevant work) .
340. See Cohen v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 964 F.2d 524, 530 (6th Cir. 1992)
(noting that attending school is not as demanding as full-time remunerative work because
classroom hours are less strenuous, and a student can miss class without penalty as well as
complete homework on her own schedule); see also Parish v. Califano, 642 F.2d 188, 192
(6th Cir. 1981) ("[The] ability to attend school on such part-time basis . . . does not establish
an ability to be engaged in substantial gainful activity.").
341. See Haulot v. Astrue, 290 F. App’x 53, 55 (9th Cir. 2008) ("The fact that
[claimant] drove short distances every four or five weeks [and engaged in other daily tasks]
does not support the conclusion that he can work eight hours a day, five days a week, on a
consistent basis."); Wilson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 303 F. App’x 565, 566 (9th Cir. 2008)
("Evidence that [claimant] occasionally drove to Phoenix, took a vacation to Hawaii, and
sometimes found the energy to go grocery shopping are not clear and convincing evidence
that the claimant led a life that is not compatible with disabling pain and limitations.").
342. See, e.g., Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284 n.7 ("[M]any home activities may not be easily
transferable to a work environment where it might be impossible to rest periodically or take
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pressures differ at home and in the workplace.343 Further, the ability to
complete light housework does not mean that an individual possesses the
functional capacity to work.344 Caring for one’s children, for example, may
be the product of desperation to retain custody, not actual functionality: "A
person can be totally disabled for purposes of entitlement to social security
[sic] benefits even if, because of . . . circumstances of desperation, he is in
fact working."345 In addition, courts have held that evidence of the ability
to perform ordinary life activities is relevant to disability assessment only if
it is inconsistent with a claimed disability.346
Courts are also hesitant to equate performing tasks under the
supervision of a health care professional with the ability to work full-time.
medication."); Ford, 518 F.3d at 983 ("We . . . believe that the ALJ erred in concluding that
Ms. Ford’s description of her daily activities worked against her. . . . [D]o[ing] such things
as washing a few dishes, ironing one or two pieces of clothing, making three or four meals
each week, and reading . . . are [not] inconsistent with her . . . contention that she is unable
to hold a full time job."); Gaylor, 292 F. App’x at 513 ("[I]t is a deficient analysis to assume
that a claimant’s ability to care for personal needs and the needs of his or her children is
synonymous with an ability to be gainfully employed."); Murphy, 872 F. Supp. at 1159
(finding that claimant’s ability to read and watch television and movies did "not necessarily
support the ALJ’s conclusion that plaintiff was capable of sedentary work," which involves
activities for a sustained period).
343. See Mendez v. Barnhart, 439 F.3d 360, 362 (7th Cir. 2006) ("The pressures, the
nature of the work, flexibility in the use of time, and other aspects of the working
environment as well, often differ dramatically between home and office or factory or other
place of paid work.").
344. See, e.g., Gaylor v. Astrue, 292 F. App’x 506, 513 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that
claimant’s ability to care for her own needs and those of her children did not demonstrate the
capability for gainful employment); Ford v. Astrue, 518 F.3d 979, 981 (8th Cir. 2008)
(holding that claimant’s ability to wash dishes, iron clothes, and make several meals a week
did not show that she could work); Wagner v. Astrue, 499 F.3d 842, 851 (8th Cir. 2007)
(holding that claimant’s ability to cook, clean, and enjoy a hobby at home did not constitute
substantial evidence of the capacity for gainful employment); Swope v. Barnhart, 436 F.3d
1023, 1026 n.4 (8th Cir. 2006) (noting that claimant’s ability to perform light housework and
visit friends did not indicate the capacity for work); Murphy v. Sec’y of Health & Human
Servs., 872 F. Supp. 1153, 1159 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding that claimant’s ability to read
and watch television did not prove that he can perform sedentary work); Gentle v. Barnhart,
430 F.3d 865, 867 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that claimant’s ability to perform housework and
take care of an infant was not the same as the ability to work in the labor market); Salts v.
Sullivan, 958 F.2d 840, 846 (8th Cir. 1992) (finding that claimant’s ability to take care of a
garden, mow a lawn, build model cars, play cards, and drive did not disprove disability).
345. Gentle v. Barnhart, 430 F.3d 865, 867 (7th Cir. 2005).
346. See Burrow v. Barnhart, 224 F. App’x 613, 616 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that
claimant’s ability to attend church and perform some housework with assistance was not
relevant to demonstrating severe fatigue and chronic pain); see also, e.g., Castillo v. Astrue,
310 F. App’x 94, 97 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that the ability to prepare meals, shop, and ride
a bike was not relevant to assessing a psychological disability).
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A number of courts have held that a claimant’s ability to perform an
isolated task while being examined by a doctor does not indicate the ability
to be hired and to retain a job that involves performing that task.347
Similarly, a single medical evaluation does not provide sufficient evidence
of disability.348 Further, the fact that a claimant performs certain physical
activities as part of medical treatment does not mean that she could engage
in similar activities outside that context.349
At least one court has held that "‘attending college on a part-time basis
is not the equivalent of being able to engage in substantial gainful activity’"
because school is often less demanding than working.350 Student absences
do not have the same implications as employee absences, since employees
must often perform work on a more rigid schedule.351
The ability to access the broader social realm through driving may
not be evidence of the capability to work either.352 One court noted that
347. See Genier v. Astrue, 298 F. App’x 105, 106 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding that claimant
who had the physical ability to watch a surveillance monitor was disabled because he had
difficulty concentrating, making quick judgments, and understanding emergency situations);
see also Ingram v. Chater, 107 F.3d 598, 604 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that "the ability
merely to lift weights occasionally in a doctor’s office" is not the same as residual functional
capacity); Wingo v. Bowen, 852 F.2d 827, 831 (5th Cir. 1988) ("[T]he fact that [claimant]
may be able to inspect a pencil or lace a football does not necessarily mean that she can
function as a pencil inspector or hand-lacer. The Secretary’s determination that she can
perform these jobs is mere speculation." (citations omitted)); McCoy v. Schweiker, 683 F.2d
1138, 1147 (8th Cir. 1982) (holding that an individual should be assessed according to her
"ability to perform the requisite physical acts day in and day out"), abrogated on other
grounds by Forney v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 266 (1998).
348. See, e.g., Cox v. Barnhart, 345 F.3d 606, 610 (8th Cir. 2003) ("We have stated
many times that the results of a one-time medical evaluation do not constitute substantial
evidence on which the ALJ can permissibly base his decision.").
349. See Vertigan v. Halter, 260 F.3d 1044, 1050 (9th Cir. 2001) ("A patient may do
[physical] activities despite pain for therapeutic reasons, but that does not mean she could
concentrate on work despite the pain or could engage in similar activity for a longer period
given the pain involved.").
350. Cohen v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 964 F.2d 524, 530 (6th Cir. 1992)
(quoting Parish v. Califano, 642 F.2d 188, 191 (6th Cir. 1981)).
351. See Parish, 642 F.2d at 192 ("[O]ne may miss occasional classes without penalty,
and homework may be scheduled for those times when the student feels his or her best.").
But see Long v. Chater, 108 F.3d 185, 188 (8th Cir. 1997) (finding that plaintiff’s claim of
impairment in reading and writing was contradicted by her making the dean’s list at her
community college).
352. See Haulot v. Astrue, 290 F. App’x 53, 55 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding that claimant’s
ability to drive short distances every four or five weeks did not indicate claimant was able to
work full time); see also Wilson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 303 F. App’x 565, 566 (9th Cir.
2008) (referring to claimant’s activities, including driving occasionally, as "sporadic and
punctuated" and finding that such activities could be consistent with disability).
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the fact that a claimant drove short distances every few weeks and
sporadically performed household chores did not "support the ALJ’s
conclusion that he could work eight hours a day, five days a week, on a
consistent basis."353 Similarly, evidence that a claimant occasionally
drove to another city, resting along the way, did not discredit her
testimony that she had disabling pain.354
Courts may even question the functionality of individuals who are
employed.355 Some courts have held that actual employment is not
concrete evidence of an ability to work. According to these courts,
disabled individuals may hold jobs out of necessity that tax their
capacities.356 Additionally, individuals working under "special
conditions"—such as employment based on "a family relationship, past
association with [their] employer, or [due to their] employer’s concern
for [their] welfare”—may not be considered gainfully employed under
the regulations supporting the Social Security Act.357
Individuals may not be viewed as disabled, however, if they are
able to perform work-related tasks in a number of situations within their
daily environments.358 For example, the Eighth Circuit in Qualls v.
353. Haulot, 290 F. App’x at 55.
354. Wilson, 303 F. App’x at 566. But see Morton v. Shalala, 943 F. Supp. 1170, 1174
(W.D. Mo. 1996) (finding that claimant who drove 475 miles without stopping or taking
medication did not have a credible complaint of disabling back pain).
355. See Miller v. Chater, 99 F.3d 972, 977–78 (10th Cir. 1996) (finding that claimant’s
brief employment did not undermine his disability status).
356. See Barnett v. Barnhart, 381 F.3d 664, 669 (7th Cir. 2004) ("Having a job is not
necessarily inconsistent with a claim of disability; the claimant ‘may have a careless or
indulgent employer or be working beyond his capacity out of desperation.’" (quoting
Henderson v. Barnhart, 349 F.3d 434, 435 (7th Cir. 2003)); see also Gentle v. Barnhart, 430
F.3d 865, 867 (7th Cir. 2005) ("A person can be totally disabled for purposes of entitlement
to social security benefits even if . . . he is in fact working."); Wilcox v. Sullivan, 917 F.2d
272, 277 (6th Cir.1990) ("[Claimant] should not be penalized because he had the courage
and determination to continue working despite his disabling condition."); Simms v.
Weinberger, 377 F. Supp. 321, 327 (M.D. Fla.1974) ("[Plaintiff] should not be penalized for
her perseverance and courage in seeking to overcome her disability.").
357. Determining Disability & Blindness, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1573(c)(6) (2010).
358. See, e.g., Heston v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 245 F.3d 528, 536 (6th Cir. 2001)
(holding that claimant who walked around her yard for exercise, rode an exercise bicycle,
attended church, vacationed, cooked, vacuumed, and made beds was not disabled); Cruze v.
Chater, 85 F.3d 1320, 1325 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that claimant who cared for a number of
farm animals, drove three hours to town weekly, and exercised on a treadmill was not
disabled); Smith v. Shalala, 987 F.2d 1371, 1374–75 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that claimant
who drove his children to school, visited relatives and friends, picked up mail from the post
office, attended church, sang for two hours at a time, and delivered sermons each week was
not disabled).
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Apfel,359 held that the plaintiff who claimed to suffer from disabling pain
and fatigue could perform work as a real estate agent because she "read,
watch[ed] television, [made] crafts, rais[ed] flowers, visit[ed] her parents
regularly, attend[ed] church twice a week, [drove], attend[ed] to personal
business, [laundered clothes, shopped for groceries, and took] care of her
grandchildren."360 In a more recent case, the same court upheld an ALJ’s
finding that an individual was not disabled because of her ability to perform
"an array" of work-related activities in a number of environments.361
The absence of medical restrictions may allow an inference of the
capacity for gainful employment as well. One court found that an ALJ
correctly determined that a claimant was not disabled because his doctors
failed to limit his physical activities and encouraged him to return to work,
and he "care[d] for his three daughters, perform[ed] household chores, cut
the grass . . . and walk[ed] up to six blocks at a time."362 Additionally,
when a claimant’s daily life activities contradict her view of her own
impairment, courts may use lack of medical findings to establish
functionality at work.363 The same is true if a claimant does not seek
regular treatment or take medication, yet complains of a medical
condition.364
Thus, under the Social Security Act, an individual’s impairments are
assessed holistically and in the aggregate across daily environments.
However, courts consider a claimant gainfully employable and ineligible
for disability benefits only when she is able to function in a number of
different environments and to perform frequent tasks that are transferrable
to the workplace. Claimants are not penalized for being able to function in
one portion of a broad environment.

359. See generally Qualls v. Apfel, 158 F.3d 425 (8th Cir. 1998).
360. Id. at 427.
361. See Clevenger v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 567 F.3d 971, 976 (8th Cir. 2009) ("[Claimant
who alleged "disabling pain" could] do[] laundry, wash[] dishes, chang[e] sheets, iron[],
prepar[e] meals, driv[e], attend[] church, and visit[] friends and relatives.").
362. Leggett v. Chater, 67 F.3d 558, 565 (5th Cir. 1995).
363. See Mastro v. Apfel, 270 F.3d 171, 179–80 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding that plaintiff
with no clinical or laboratory reports could not substantiate his claim of disabling pain).
364. See Novotny v. Chater, 72 F.3d 669, 671 (8th Cir. 1995) (finding that plaintiff who
did not seek medical attention but who carried out garbage and drove his wife to and from
work failed to establish he was suffering from disabling pain).

250

68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 187 (2011)
B. Environment-Framing for Protected Class and Remedy

Social Security disability cases highlight the importance of
environment-framing for judicial outcomes. The environment in which
disability is assessed may be as, if not more, important than how disability
is defined. Despite a restrictive definition of "disability," broad frames
often result in courts granting plaintiffs disability status in Social Security
cases. By contrast, broad frames and a more inclusive definition of
"disability" result in courts denying plaintiffs disability eligibility under the
ADA. In order to give force to the ADA and to address fragmentation,
courts must alter the way in which environments are framed and assessed.
Social Security cases should inform environment-framing under the
ADA, in terms of scope and method of assessment. The first step is for
courts to consistently use broad environment-frames for disability eligibility
and remedy purposes. A broad environment-frame enables a more
meaningful and realistic assessment of an individual’s functional capacities.
Individuals function across numerous environments in a given day;
disability does not begin and end based on statutorily-protected contexts.
Assessing functional impairment under a narrow environment-frame
fragments the human experience of disability by creating a disjunction
between the lived and legally recognized aspects of disability. It also
undermines injunctive relief. Drawing environment-frames broadly allows
for more meaningful access to statutorily protected environments, i.e.,
workplaces, transportation, and places of public service and
accommodation.
The second step entails a different method of assessment of broad
environment-frames. Under the ADA, many courts currently apply broad
frames to the disability threshold test and deny class eligibility when an
individual is perceived as functioning in some portion of the large
environment.365 The concept of aggregate impairments from Social
Security litigation is useful at this juncture. While the ADA does not
consider impairments unless they relate to a particular major life activity, a
litigant could be assessed more holistically with respect to a given major
life activity.366 This would entail considering impairments that relate to a
365. Supra Part II.
366. Under the ADA, plaintiffs are not allowed to demonstrate disability by showing
they are partially limited in multiple major life activities. Rather, they must prove
"substantial limitation" in one major life activity. See ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A) (2006)
(defining disability as "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more
major life activities of [an] individual"). By assessing disability in distinct spheres, the ADA
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major life activity in the aggregate, or across environments, to gain a more
complete view of the extent of functionality. Disability status would be
granted, however, unless an individual is able to function throughout many
or "an array" of her daily environments in a manner relevant to her claimed
limitation.367 The same holistic assessment would be used to consider
functionality for purposes of making accommodation or other modification.
The proposed solution requires judicial rather than legislative change.
With respect to eligibility, courts would continue to use the same broad
environment but employ a different method of assessing functioning for
major life activities. Courts would consider limitations of major life
activities in the aggregate across daily environments and would not deny
disability status, unless an individual was able to perform the major life
activity at stake across a significant number of environments. In the
remedy context, courts would adopt a different, broader environmentframe. This would involve an assessment of functioning in a larger
physical space to allow more meaningful access to the environments
protected under the ADA.
VI. Conclusion
"Environment-framing" may determine judicial outcomes for
individuals with disabilities. While the ADA does not speak to defining
environments, it implicitly requires that courts assess environments to
determine disability eligibility and remedy. This is because measuring
functioning in these contexts requires an assessment of impairment within
physical spaces. Typically, courts frame environments broadly for
disability eligibility purposes.
Courts usually analyze these broad
environment-frames in a manner that views individuals who are able to
function in some part of their environment as without limitation in a major
life activity and therefore as not legally disabled. At the remedy stage of
disability analysis, courts often adopt narrow environment-frames.
Generally, the narrower the environment selected for remedy, the more
limited the accommodation or other modification. As a result, courts use
does not account for the fact that different major life activities, e.g., "working" and
"performing manual tasks," often overlap. Id. Thus, one could argue that the individual
activity assessment itself provides a fragmented view of an individual’s functional
capacities, though assessing an individual in a broad environment mitigates that
fragmentation to some extent.
367. Clevenger v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 567 F.3d 971, 976 (8th Cir. 2009).
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environment-frames inconsistently for assessing impairment, and the
frames they choose undermine disability protections at both stages of
disability analysis. Environment-framing thus results in fragmentation, or a
disconnection between the lived and legal experience of disability. An
individual may experience disability as continuous, but the law affords only
sporadic (or no) protection. The AAA, which expands the definition of
"disability," does not resolve these problems. Drawing from the method of
assessing environments within Social Security disability benefits cases, this
Article proposes a two-part solution: First, courts should adopt a broad
environment-frame throughout disability analysis, and, second, individuals
should be assessed in a more complete or holistic manner that requires
functioning in a number of environments to deny disability status.
It is worth pausing at this juncture to consider why courts frame
environments as they do under the ADA, with trends towards broad frames
for the disability threshold test and narrow frames for remedy. One
explanation is that it is simply random, since defining the environment is an
implied rather than explicit part of established statutory tests. Proof of this
may be that a minority of federal courts do not frame environments broadly
for relief purposes. In these and other cases, courts may be guided by
intuition about whether someone is disabled or should be entitled to a
remedy. A second explanation, and the one I am inclined to believe, is that
consciously or subconsciously, courts select environments guided by the
desire to shield firms from the effects of an unfunded mandate. Given the
broad definition of disability under the AAA, this highlights the potential
significance of environment-framing in the decades to come.

